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Resolving the Public Health Crisis in the 
Developing World: Problems and Barriers of 
Access to Essential Medicines 
Bryan Mercurio* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Over the last decade, public health and development issues have become topics of 
great international concern.  Public health in many parts of the world has reached crisis 
level: Over 14 million people are killed by infectious diseases each year (90% of which 
are in the developing world); over 40 million people globally are infected with 
HIV/AIDS (90% of which are in the developing world) and the disease kills over three 
million people annually; over 500 million people are infected with malaria each year and 
the disease kills upwards of two million people annually; over eight million people 
develop active tuberculosis (TB) each year and the disease kills over two million people 
annually (95% of those afflicted and 99% of deaths resulting from TB are found in the 
developing world)1  Hundreds of thousands more people die each year from other, lesser 
known, diseases which predominantly affect developing countries.2 
¶2 Perhaps even more alarming is the fact that while most illnesses – especially 
infectious diseases – are preventable or treatable with existing medicines, the World 
Health Organization (WHO) estimates that over 1.7 billion people – nearly one-third of 
the world’s population – have inadequate or no access to these essential medicines.3  
                                                 
 * Faculty of Law, University of New South Wales; Director, International Trade and Development 
Project at the Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law; Fellow of the Tim Fischer Centre for Global Trade and 
Finance; Visiting Professorial Fellow at the Institute of International Economic Law, Georgetown 
University Law Center. The author acknowledges the UNSW Faculty Research Grant for making this 
research possible and thanks the UNSW Researcher Discussion Group, Andreas Ziegler, Jurgen Kurtz, 
Tania Voon and Andrew Mitchell for commenting on earlier drafts. Special thanks to Bradly Condon for 
his insightful comments and Nikki Chong for her editorial assistance. 
 1 See MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES [Doctors without Borders] (MSF), MILLIONS HAVE A DRUG 
PROBLEM: THEY CAN’T GET ANY 6-7 (2004), available at  http://www.accessmed-
msf.org/documents/campaignbrochure2004.pdf [hereinafter MSF 2004]; UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT , 
PRESCRIPTION FOR HEALTHY DEVELOPMENT : INCREASING ACCESS TO MEDICINES, REPORT OF THE TASK 
FORCE ON HIV/AIDS, MALARIA, TB, AND ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES, PRESCRIPTIONS FOR 
HEALTHY DEVELOPMENT : INCREASING ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 26 (Beryl Leach et al. eds., 
2005), available at http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/TF5-medicines-Complete.pdf 
[hereinafter UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005]. 
 2 For instance, lesser known diseases such as the African trypanosomiasis, Chagas, leishmaniasis, and 
dengue fever also kill thousands of people each year. See MSF 2004, supra note 1, at 7. See generally 
PHILIP STEVENS, DISEASES OF POVERTY AND THE 10/90 GAP (2004). 
 3 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO), THE WORLD MEDICINES SITUATION 61 (2004), available at 
http://www.searo.who.int/LinkFiles/Reports_World_Medicines_Situation.pdf [hereinafter WHO 2004].  A 
WHO study conducted in 1999 reveals that low-income countries make up approximately 80% of those 
persons without sufficient access to essential medicines. Id. The problem is most severe in India and Africa, 
which make up 53% of those individuals without sufficient access to essential medicines. Id. It must be 
noted that in percentage terms, the situation has improved over the last thirty years (in 1975, less than 50% 
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Moreover, another study recently found that 10 million children a year die from 
preventable diseases and conditions, with almost all these deaths occur ring in poor 
nations.4  Another study found that prompt diagnosis and treatment of health problems in 
Africa and Southeast Asia alone could save approximately 4 million lives each year.5  In 
addition, resistance to existing treatments due to improper use or over-exposure plays a 
significant role in increasing the severity of the public health crises in many nations.6  
Other studies link health with the economic prosperity of nations and persuasively 
demonstrate the dramatic role the HIV/AIDS epidemic has played in the declining 
economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa.7  The consequences of the vicious cycle between 
poverty and illness are clear8 and the situation will become even more untenable unless 
the world comes together to resolve the public health crisis engulfing much of the 
developing world. 
¶3 Fortunately, and in large part due to the tireless efforts of several well- funded non-
governmental organisations (NGOs),9 health-related issues of developing countries, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
of people had regular access to essential medicines). However, due to population growth, the actual number 
of persons without access to essential medicines has remained at approximately 1.7 billion. See id. at 61-63. 
 4 Robert E. Black et al., Where and Why are 10 Million Children Dying Every Year? , 361 The Lancet 
2226 (2003). For similar statistics, see U.K. Dept. for Int’l Dev. (DFID), Increasing Access to Essential 
Medicines in the Developing World: United Kingdom Government Policy and Plans 7 (2004), available at 
www.dfid.gov.uk/Pubs/files/accessmedicines.pdf [hereinafter DFID 2004]. 
 5 DFID 2004, supra note 4, at 8. 
 6 UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra note 1, at 26. It is clear that inappropriate use of medicines 
leads to resistance. In fact, one study found that in Tanzania, 75% of health workers were dispensing 
inappropriate doses of malaria regiments to stretch inadequate supplies. Reducing the required dosage of 
malaria treatment induces resistance and is a major cause of the malaria crisis engulfing part of the 
developing world. See id. at 88. See also  Melinda Pavin et al., Prescribing Practices of Rural Primary 
Health Care Physicians in Uzbekistan, 8(2) TROP. MED. INT’L HEALTH 182, 182–90 (2003). For 
approaches resolving this issue, including acquiring more qualified health workers and dealing with 
illiterate users see R.O. Laing et al., Ten Recommendations to Improve Use of Medicines in Developing 
Countries, 16(1) HEALTH POLICY PLAN. 13, 13-20 (2001). 
 7 See generally WHO, WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2002: REDUCING RISKS, PROMOTING HEALTHY LIFE 
(2002), available at http://www.who.int/whr/2002/en/whr02_en.pdf; see also  Brazil Ministry of Health, 
National AIDS Drug Policy 2001, available at http://www.aids.gov.br/final/biblioteca/drug/drug2.htm (last 
visited Jan. 1, 2007) (linking improved health and prolonged life expectancy to increased productivity, 
improved use of resources and lower medical costs). Moreover, life expectancy in Africa increased by nine 
years between 1960 and 1990, while life expectancy in high-income countries increased by six years. The 
impact of these gains added between 1.7% and 2.7% per annum to the growth rate of per capita GDP. 
Recently, however, HIV/AIDS induced a decline in economic welfare approximated at 1.7% per annum, 
leading to an overall growth rate of –2.6%. In addition, economic welfare in countries heavily impacted by 
AIDS, such as Botswana, decreased by over 8% per annum for the past decade. Dean T. Jamison et al., The 
Effect of the AIDS Epidemic on Economic Welfare in Sub-Saharan Africa (Comm’n on Macroeconomics 
and Health Working Paper Series, Paper No. WG1: 13, 2001). For more on the linkage between health and 
economic prosperity, see, for example WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1993--INVESTING IN 
HEALTH (1993); David E. Bloom & Ajay S. Mahal, Does the AIDS Epidemic Threaten Economic Growth?, 
77 J. ECONOMETRICS 105 (1997); William D. Nordhaus, The Health of Nations: The Contribution of 
Improved Health to Living Standards (Nat’l. Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. W8818, 2002); 
John Luke Gallup & Jeffrey D. Sachs, The Economic Burden of Malaria (Ctr. for Int’l Dev. at Harvard, 
Working Paper No. 52, 2000), available at http://www2.cid.harvard.edu/cidwp/052.pdf; WHO, WORLD 
HEALTH REPORT 2000, HEALTH SYSTEMS: IMPROVING PERFORMANCE (2000); HEALTH AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH: FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (Guillem López-Casasnovas et al. eds., 2005). 
 8 K. Balasubramaniam, Access to Medicines and Public Policy Safeguards under TRIPS, in TRADING IN 
KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND SUSTAINABILITY 135-42 (Christophe 
Bellmann et al. eds., 2003).  
 9 For more information on the work of one such NGO on the issue, see Ruth Mayne, The Global 
Campaign on Patents and Access to Medicines: An Oxfam Perspective, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL 
Vol. 5:1] Bryan Mercurio 
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more particularly the issue of accessibility to essential medicines, have garnered much 
worldwide attention in recent years.10  Unfortunately, public debate on the issue is most 
often limited to blaming the pharmaceutical industry and patent regulations under the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and its Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)11 for the lack of accessibility and affordability of 
much needed drugs in developing countries.  While it may be ‘in vogue’ to attack the 
pharmaceutical industry, TRIPS and the WTO more generally, 12 such attacks are usually 
simplistic, myopic and apart from adding little substance to the debate, they divert 
precious time and resources away from efforts that really count toward alleviating the 
suffering caused by the devastating health crisis.  In reality,the impact of patents on 
public health is moot for many in the developing countries where inadequate healthcare 
and health infrastructure poses a much more immediate and significant problem.  Put 
simply, patents do not even come into consideration if one cannot get a diagnosis by 
virtue of the fact that they do not have access to a doctor, or more accurately, a properly 
trained and equipped doctor. 
¶4 This article examines the many factors that have created and continue to perpetuate 
the ongoing health crisis in developing countries.  In so doing, the article will reveal that 
the focus on patent regulation is largely misguided and that the targeting of 
pharmaceutical companies and TRIPS has lead to an unfortunate divergence from the 
actual critical issues that affect the delivery of much-needed care and medicines to the 
developing world.  The article then argues that the critical issues lie not in constructing 
appropriate TRIPS provisions, but more so in providing financial resources to build, 
maintain and stabilize proper healthcare systems in those developing countries afflicted 
with public health crises.  Just as importantly, the article also illustrates the need for 
developing countries to prioritize public health while at the same time minimize the 
effects of poor economic planning and policies as well as societal problems such as 
corruption and civil strife.  This article does not fully absolve pharmaceutical companies 
from blame nor does it claim that TRIPS strikes the appropriate balance between creators 
                                                                                                                                                 
PROPERTY RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT  244-58 (Peter Drahos & Ruth Mayne eds., 
2002).  
 10 For a definition of access to essential medicines see WHO, THE WORLD MEDICINES SITUATION 61-74 
(1999). This definition was essentially incorporated into the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs): 
“The world's time-bound and quantified targets for addressing extreme poverty in its many dimensions-
income poverty, hunger, disease, lack of adequate shelter, and exclusion-while promoting gender equality, 
education, and environmental sustainability. They are also basic human rights-the rights of each person on 
the planet to health, education, shelter, and security.” UN Millennium Project website, 
http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/goals/index.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2007).  Goal 6 seeks to combat 
HIV/AIDS, Malaria and other diseases, and targets 2015 for halting and beginning to reverse the incidence 
and spread of these and other diseases. Id.  
 11 See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 
15, 1994, Legal Instruments--Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) 
[hereinafter Uruguay Round] (establishing the WTO in the last round of GATT and also creating treaties 
covering various trade topics); Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 
15 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL 
INSTRUMENTS--RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter 
TRIPS Agreement] (establishing a multilateral agreement creating minimum protection standards for 
various forms of intellectual property among Memb er States). 
 12 See, e.g., PASCALE BOULET ET AL., MSF, DRUG PATENTS UNDER THE SPOTLIGHT : SHARING PRACTICAL 
KNOWLEDGE ABOUT PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS (2004), available at  http://www.accessmed-
msf.org/documents/Patent%20report%20.pdf. 
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and users in every situation, but much has already been written on these two issues.13  
Instead, this article focuses on and examines possible solutions or initiatives that may be 
adopted to alleviate the current public health problem and assesses their practicability in 
light of the particular situations and circumstances affecting the developing world. 
¶5 Part II briefly reviews the TRIPS Agreement and analyses efforts to rebalance the 
Agreement in favor of developing countries in the form of the Doha Declaration on 
Public Health and its derivative agreements.  Part III shows that, although the regime of 
patent protection has been blamed for creating or at least worsening the public health 
crises inflicting much of the developing world, the situations is far more complex and, in 
reality, patents and TRIPS have played a very small role in the crisis.  Part IV reviews 
several contributing factors into the crisis and offers several suggestions which, if fully 
implemented, will go a long way in alleviating the public health crises and improving the 
lives of millions in the developing world.  Part V concludes that the health crisis raging 
through much of the developing world can be alleviated, but only through a global 
commitment from the international community whereby developed countries increase the 
amount as well as the coordination of funding and aid activities and developing countries 
prioritize public health, improve infrastructure and work towards creating an environment 
conducive to growth and sustainability, and study and implement alternatives to current 
research and development schemes that provide more incentive to research certain 
diseases. 
II. TRIPS AND THE DOHA DECLARATION ON PUBLIC HEALTH 
¶6 The TRIPS Agreement is comprehensive in its coverage and includes copyright and 
related rights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, product and 
process patents, layout-designs (topographies) of integrated circuits, and protection of 
undisclosed information. 14  Like other covered agreements of the WTO, TRIPS is based 
on the most-favored-nation and national treatment principles, but unlike any of the other 
WTO agreements, TRIPS also establishes minimum levels of protection that each 
Member must provide and grant to other Members.15  It is imperative to understand that 
such a regulatory, harmonized approach to this issue is unlike the approach taken in any 
of the other WTO Agreements. 
                                                 
 13 See, e.g., Peter Drahos, Expanding Intellectual Property’s Empire: the Role of FTAs, GRAIN, Nov. 
2003, http://www.grain.org/rights/tripsplus.cfm?id=28 (last visited July 16, 2006); Laurence R. Helfer, 
Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property 
Lawmaking , 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2004); Frederick M. Abbott, The TRIPS Agreement, Access to 
Medicines and the WTO Doha Ministerial Conference (Fla. St. Univ. Coll. of Law, Pub. Law Working 
Paper No. 36 and QUNO Occasional Paper No. 7, 2001), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=285934; Gregory Shaffer, Recognizing Public Goods in 
WTO Dispute Settlement: Who Participates? Who Decides? The Case of TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patent 
Protection , 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 459 (2004); Bradly Condon & Tapen Sinha, Global Diseases, Global 
Patents and Differential Treatment in WTO Law: Criteria for Suspending Patent Obligations in Developing 
Countries, 26 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1 (2005). 
 14 See TRIPS Agreement, supra  note 11, at Part II. 
 15 Id.; see generally General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Es tablishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 
(1994). 
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¶7 The controversial inclusion of intellectual property into the multilateral trading 
system has already been well-traversed in existing literature and will not be repeated 
here.16  It must be noted, however, that even with the lengthy implementation periods and 
‘flexibilities’ built into TRIPS, several WTO Members and interested observers have 
long recognized that TRIPS results in overall trade gains for developed nations,17 while at 
the same time failing to reach an appropriate balance with respect to patent protection and 
access to life-saving medicines in developing and least-developed countries.18  
Unfortunately, reaching agreement on improvements to the system has proven to be a 
much harder proposition and in this regard, the work of several NGOs should be given 
due credit for their persistent efforts and pressure in forcing the issue onto the agenda and 
keeping it in the spotlight of multilateral discussions.19  Those organizations were 
undoubtedly partially responsible for getting public health issues on the agenda at the 
Third Ministerial Conference held in Seattle in 1999.20  Regrettably, the Seattle 
Ministerial ended without success and the resolution of several key health issues did not 
solidify until the Fourth Ministerial Conference, held in Doha, Qatar in 2001, launched 
the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations (Doha Round).21 
¶8 At Doha, Members adopted a Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health (Doha 
Declaration or the Declaration) which restated and affirmed the right of Member States to 
take measures to protect public health, clarified certain textual ambiguities contained in 
TRIPS and attempted to provide assistance to developing countries and LDCs in 
resolving the public health crises that are devastating many parts of the developing 
world.22  The Declaration is significant for a number of reasons.  First, it “represented the 
first time international health and development was discussed at every level of WTO 
governance.”23  Second, it was “the first significant victory for developing countries in 
                                                 
 16 See, e.g., Bryan C. Mercurio, TRIPs, Patents and Access to Life-Saving Drugs in the Developing 
World, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP . L. REV. 211, 215-16 (2004); Robert Weissman, A Long, Strange TRIPs: 
The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to Harmonize Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining 
WTO Legal Alternatives Available to Third World Countries, 17 U. PA. J. INT 'L ECON. L. 1069, 1072-77 
(1996); Ruth L. Okediji, Back to Bilateralism? Pendulum Swings in International Intellectual Property 
Protection , 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 125 (2003-04); Adronico O. Adede, Origins and History of the 
TRIPS Negotiations, in TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND 
SUSTAINABILITY 23, 23-35 (Christophe Bellmann et al. eds., 2003). 
 17 See, e.g., Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development, 32 CASE W. RES. 
J. OF INT’L L. 471 (2000). 
 18 See, e.g., UK COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT 
POLICY (2002), available at http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/CIPRfullfinal.pdf 
[hereinafter UK CIPR]; TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND 
SUSTAINABILITY (Christophe Bellmann et al. eds., 2003).  
 19 For a listing of NGO position papers filed with the WTO before the Doha Round see WTO, Non-
Governmental Organizations: Working Papers, http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/posp21_e.htm 
(last visited Dec. 30, 2006). 
 20 For a worthy discussion on the negotiating history of TRIPS and the Doha Declaration see SUSAN K. 
SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW, THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 121, 121-
62 (2003).  
 21 Elizabeth Olson, Squabbles at the Start for World Trade Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2002, at W1. 
 22 See World Trade Organization (WTO), Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. For detailed 
information and analysis regarding the lead up to the Implementation Agreement see Mercurio, supra  note 
16. See also  KATHARINA GAMHARTER, ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE MEDICINES: DEVELOPING RESPONSES 
UNDER THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND EC LAW 159-246 (2004). 
 23 Mercurio, supra note 16, at 212. 
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the short history of TRIPS.”24  Finally, the Declaration recognized that public health 
issues can take precedence over the rights of private intellectual property holders.25  India 
called the Declaration “the most important single achievement of the Doha Round,” 
while the Philippines hailed the Declaration as being “the crowning glory of the WTO’s 
contribution to global welfare and humanitarian concerns, especially for those who were 
gravely afflicted by the scourge of epidemics and other public health problems.”26 
¶9 Broadly speaking, the Declaration sought to “clarify” the TRIPS Agreement while 
giving emphasis to the “flexibilities” already written into the agreement, including the 
right of Members to invoke those provisions when needed.27  Paragraphs 1 through 5 
contain the Declaration’s most significant conclusions.  Paragraphs 1 through 3 outline 
the concerns of both developing and developed countries by providing context for the 
issue of intellectual property protection for medicines while recognizing the need to 
balance private property and public welfare interests.28  More specifically, paragraph 1 
“recognizes the gravity of the public health problems afflicting many developing and 
least-developed countries, especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, 
malaria and other epidemics,”29 while paragraphs 2 and 3 express the need for TRIPS to 
be part of the wider national and international action to address the problems and 
recognize that the link between intellectual property protection for the creation of new 
medicines as well as the concerns about the effect of intellectual property rights (IPRs) on 
prices.30 
¶10 Paragraph 4 affirms the principle that protecting public health and promoting access 
to medicines is a valid basis for Members to enact exceptions to patent protection in their 
domestic legislation. 31  Specifically, paragraph 4 states that TRIPS “does not and should 
not prevent Members from taking measures to protect public health” and “affirms that the 
Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of 
WTO Members' right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to 
medicines for all.”32  Thus, paragraph 4 reinforces the plain meaning of Article 8 of the 
TRIPS Agreement, which permits Members to “adopt measures necessary to protect 
public health…”33 
¶11 Paragraph 5 provides Members with flexibilities in implementing TRIPS and 
reaffirms the right of WTO Members to use the provisions in TRIPS for the purposes of 
Paragraph 4.34  The paragraph sets out the “provisions,” which may be used for this 
purpose: 
(a) In applying the customary rules of interpretation of public international 
law, each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of 
                                                 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. See generally Doha Declaration, supra note 22, at para. 4. 
 26 Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Minutes of Meeting held in the 
Centre William Rappard on Nov. 25-27, 29, and Dec. 20, 2002, IP/C/M/38 (Feb. 5, 2003) at 38, 45. 
 27 See generally Doha Declaration, supra note 22. 
 28 See Doha Declaration, supra note 22, at paras. 1-3. 
 29 Id. at para. 1. 
 30 Id. at paras. 2 and 3. 
 31 Id. at para. 4. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id.; TRIPS Agreement, supra  note 11, at Article 8. 
 34 Id. at para. 5. 
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the object and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its 
objectives and principles. 
(b) Each member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the 
freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted. 
(c) Each member has the right to determine what constitutes a national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood 
that public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency. 
(d) The effect of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that are relevant 
to the exhaustion of intellectual property rights is to leave each member 
free to establish its own regime for such exhaustion without challenge, 
subject to the MFN and national treatment provisions of Articles 3 and 4.35 
¶12 Paragraph 6 “recognizes that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing 
capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of 
compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement,” but the paragraph left the issue 
unresolved, instead instructing the Council for TRIPS to find an “expeditious solution” to 
the problem and to report to the General Council before the end of 2002.36 
¶13 The failure to resolve the availability of compulsory licensing exceptions to patent 
protection for countries suffering a public health crisis with insufficient or no 
manufacturing capabilities tempered the success of the Declaration. 37  As TRIPS Article 
31(f) conditions the issuance of compulsory licenses on being “predominantly for the 
supply of the domestic market of the Member authorizing such use,” a Member State 
could only override valid patent laws so long as it obtained the generic drugs from 
domestic producers.38  Whether intentionally or accidentally, Article 31(f) prevents a 
country from benefiting from the compulsory licensing provision if it does not have 
sufficient manufacturing capabilities because, in practice, the provision limits the 
licensee’s ability to export medicines to a country with public health needs, thereby 
preventing countries with insufficient or no manufacturing capabilities from taking 
advantage of the provision. 39  Additionally, as most countries needing to make use of the 
patent exceptions are economically troubled nations with insufficient or no 
manufacturing capabilities, Article 31 of TRIPS failed in its purpose of assisting those 
nations it was designed to benefit.40 
¶14 After several delays and weeks of constant negotiation in the days leading to the 
Fifth Ministerial Conference (Cancun Ministerial), a resolution to the issue was finally 
reached on August 30, 2003.41  In fact, when endless debate over technical points looked 
                                                 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at para. 6. 
 37 See generally id . 
 38 See TRIPS, supra note 11, at art. 31(f).  
 39 Id. 
 40 Mercurio, supra  note 16, at 213. 
 41 On November 25, 2002, the Chairperson of the TRIPS Council informed the Members that he was 
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as if it would hamper an agreement being formed, a group of African countries reminded 
Ministers that while potential solutions had been discussed in the interim years, the 
situation of medicinal access in poor countries had worsened.42  During this time, those 
countries continued to lose the battle against such public health epidemics as 
tuberculosis, malaria, and HIV/AIDS.43  In a joint statement, the group poignantly stated 
that “8,480 people had died unnecessarily in Africa from HIV/AIDS and other diseases 
since the talks stalled over an accompanying document to the Agreement only two days 
earlier [Aug. 28, 2003].”44  The statement had the desired effect: the Ministers put their 
differences aside and reached agreement on a “temporary waiver” in the form of The 
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health (Implementation Agreement) and accompanying Chairperson’s Statement.45  At 
the time, Canadian Ambassador Sergio Marchi commented: “[The African countries] 
showed that the poorest among us do make a difference in this organization...  They 
helped the WTO find its heart and soul.”46 
¶15 The Implementation Agreement resolved the Article 31(f) situation by creating an 
exception to Article 31(f) of TRIPS that allows nations with insufficient or no 
manufacturing capabilities to override intellectual property protection and import generic 
copies of patented drugs to combat public health crises.47  However, in order to be TRIPS 
compliant, the importing Member must abide by several procedural steps, namely that the 
importing Member:  
(1) must notify the TRIPS Council of the “names and expected quantities 
of the products needed”;  
                                                                                                                                                 
holding consultations on implementing the Paragraph 6 mandate of the Doha Declaration. On November 
29, the Chairperson reported that intensive consultations had led to significant progress and that a draft 
legal instrument was almost finalized. The draft was tabled on December 16, but was not adopted when the 
U.S. would not agree to the paragraph concerning the scope of diseases covered. See Minutes of TRIPS 
Council Meeting, supra  note 26, at 33-34; Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Note from the Chairperson, JOB(02)/217 (2002). 
 42 Naomi Koppel, WTO Lets Poor Nations Import Cheap Drugs, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 30, 2003, 
available at  http://www.aegis.com/news/ap/2003/AP030847.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2007). 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Council for TRIPS, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and Public Health, WT/L/540 (Aug. 30, 2003) [hereinafter Implementation Agreement]. The agreement 
was only finalized when the Memb ers agreed to attach a statement to the text setting out the conditions 
under which the measure detailed in the Implementation Agreement can be used. Among other things, the 
Statement: (i) “recognizes that the [compulsory licensing] system ... should be used in good faith to protect 
public health and [not as] an instrument to pursue industrial or commercial policy objectives”; (ii) 
“recognizes that the purpose of the [Implementation Agreement] would be defeated if [drugs were] diverted 
from the [intended] markets” and calls on Members to take “all reasonable measures” to “prevent such 
diversion”; and (iii) reiterates the importance of Members to seek expeditious and amicable resolutions to 
issues arising from the Implementation Agreement. See The General Council Chairperson's Statement, 
WTO NEWS, Aug. 30, 2003, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news03_e/trips_stat_28aug03_e.htm 
[hereinafter Chairperson's Statement].  The Implementation Agreement was transformed into a permanent 
amendment of the TRIPS on December 6, 2005. This represented the first time a WTO Agreement had 
been amended. 
 46 Koppel, supra  note 42.  
 47 See Implementation Agreement, supra  note 45.  
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(2) must confirm that it is either a LDC or “establish[] that it has 
insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector 
for the products in question”; and  
(3) confirm that, if the “product is patented in its territory, [that] it has 
granted or intends to grant a compulsory licence in accordance with 
[TRIPS] Article 31.”48 
¶16 The Implementation Agreement also outlines several procedural conditions an 
exporting Member must fulfill when issuing a compulsory license: 
2. The obligations of an exporting Member under Article 31(f) of the 
TRIPS Agreement shall be waived with respect to the grant by it of a 
compulsory licence to the extent necessary for the purposes of production 
of a pharmaceutical product(s) and its export to an eligible importing 
Member(s) in accordance with the terms set out below in this paragraph: 
a) the eligible importing Member(s) has made a notification to the Council 
for TRIPS, that: 
(i) specifies the names and expected quantities of the product(s) needed; 
(ii) confirms that the eligible importing Member in question, other than a 
least developed country Member, has established that it has insufficient or 
no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector for the 
product(s) in question in one of the ways set out in the Annex to this 
Decision; and 
(iii) confirms that, where a pharmaceutical product is patented in its 
territory, it has granted or intends to grant a compulsory licence in 
accordance with Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement and the provisions of 
this Decision; 
(b) the compulsory licence issued by the exporting Member under this 
Decision shall contain the following conditions: 
(i) only the amount necessary to meet the needs of the eligible importing 
Member(s) may be manufactured under the licence and the entirety of this 
production shall be exported to the Member(s) which has notified its needs 
to the Council for TRIPS; 
(ii) products produced under the licence shall be clearly identified as being 
produced under the system set out in this Decision through specific 
labelling or marking.  Suppliers should distinguish such products through 
                                                 
 48 Id. at para. 2(a). 
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special packaging and/or special colouring/shaping of the products 
themselves, provided that such distinction is feasible and does not have a 
significant impact on price; and 
(iii) before shipment begins, the licensee shall post on a website the 
following information: 
- the quantities being supplied to each destination as referred to in indent 
(i) above; and 
- the distinguishing features of the product(s) referred to in indent (ii) 
above;  
(c) the exporting Member shall notify the Council for TRIPS of the grant 
of the licence, including the conditions attached to it.  The information 
provided shall include the name and address of the licensee, the product(s) 
for which the licence has been granted, the quantity(ies) for which it has 
been granted, the country(ies) to which the product(s) is (are) to be 
supplied and the duration of the licence.  The notification shall also 
indicate the address of the website referred to in subparagraph (b)(iii) 
above.49 
¶17 While the Implementation Agreement goes some way in addressing the legal hole 
that existed, it is not a miracle solution and to hold it out as such would be extremely 
misleading. 50  To some, the Implementation Agreement fails to satisfactorily resolve 
several issues, including: (i) the scope of diseases and product coverage; (ii) countries 
that would be eligible to use the system; (iii) ensuring adequate remuneration; and (iv) 
safeguarding the system against diversion of drugs into other markets.51  Health and 
policy advocates, meanwhile, have also criticized the Implementation Agreement, in 
particular the prerequisite that a drug supplied under compulsory licence must normally 
be clearly identifiable as a generic version.52  These critics often argue that even though 
the requirement may be met through a variety of features – such as labelling, marking, 
                                                 
 49 Implementation Agreement, supra  note 45, at para. 2. 
 50 See Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO Medicines Decision: World Pharmaceutical Trade and the 
Protection of Public Health, 99 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 317, 325 (2005); Jacques H. J. Bourgeois & Thaddeus J. 
Burns, Implementing Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on Trade and Public Health: The Waiver 
Solution , 5 J. OF WORLD INTELL. PROP . 835, 838 (2002). 
 51 See generally Mercurio, supra  note 16. 
 52 For criticism, see MSF, MSF Comments on the Draft Chairman's Statement of 21 August 2003 (Aug. 
26, 2003), http://www.accessmed-
msf.org/prod/publications.asp?scntid=26820031712133&contenttype=PARA& [hereinafter MSF 
Comments]; MSF, Neither Expeditious, Nor a Solution: 
The WTO August 30th Decision is Unworkable, http://www.accessmed-
msf.org/prod/publications.asp?scntid=10820061618476&contenttype=PARA& (last visited Nov. 17, 2006) 
[hereinafter MSF, Neither Expeditious]. MSF also criticizes the requirement of prior negotiation before 
issuing a compulsory licence (which can be waived for a “national emergency” or for public non-
commercial use), the anti-diversion measures built into the waiver, notification of intention to use the 
Implementation Agreement, and–somewhat bizarrely–even the requirement that the licensee must post on a 
website the quantities being supplied by compulsory licence and the distinguishing features of the supplied 
drugs. Id. 
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special packaging, or by the specific colouring of shaping of the drug – ensuring that such 
distinguishing characteristics are present could raise procedural and administrative costs 
in the export of generic versions.53  This could possibly render the process less cost-
effective and efficient than initially presumed and lengthen the time it takes to get the 
generic drugs to countries where they are needed.54  Furthermore, many in the 
international community believe that meeting other requirements of the Implementation 
Agreement will also make the waiver hard to exploit.55 
¶18 In addition, and importantly as will be discussed below, both developing and 
developed countries have been slow to secure the necessary domestic implementing 
legislation operationalizing the Implementation Agreement.  For instance, countries that 
may wish to take advantage of the provision in the future – that is, those which could 
possibly have insufficient or no manufacturing capability to meet a public health need – 
have by and large not passed domestic legislation which would override patent laws and 
allow them to import necessary medicines under a compulsory licence.  In addition, 
countries which have pharmaceutical manufacturing capabilities have been slow to pass 
legislation allowing their respective industry to supply nations attempting to make use of 
the provision with the requested drugs under compulsory licence.56  For some time, only 
Canada and Norway had passed the necessary implementing legislation. 57  At the time of 
this writing, China, the European Communities, India, Korea, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland have also enacted comprehensive legislation implementing the 30 August 
decision. 58  Even more worrisome is the fact that some developed nations do not appear 
interested in promoting and passing such legislation. 59 
                                                 
 53 See, e.g., MSF Comments, supra note 52; MSF, Neither Expeditious, supra note 52 ; Cecilia Oh, The 
New “Deal” On Trips and Drugs: What Does it Mean for Access to Medicines? , in TWN BRIEFINGS FOR 
CANCUN 4, 4 (2003), available at  http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/cancun4.doc; contra  CARLOS CORREA, 
DEPARTMENT OF ESSENTIAL DRUGS AND MEDICINES POLICY, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WTO GENERAL 
COUNCIL DECISION ON PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE DOHA DECLARATION ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND PUBLIC 
HEALTH 22 (2004), www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/WTO_DOHA_DecisionPara6final.pdf.  It must 
also be noted that the Implementation Agreement waives the obligation for packaging, colouring or shaping 
when it is either not feasible or significantly impacts upon the price. Implementation Agreement, supra note 
45, at para. 2(b)(ii). 
 54 See, e.g., Duncan Matthews, WTO Decision on Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: A Solution to the Access to Essential Medicines 
Problem? , 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 73, 96-97 (2004). 
 55 See, e.g., Oh, supra  note 53; Campaign For Access To Essential Medicines, Joint NGO Statement on 
TRIPS and Public Health WTO Deal on Medicines: a “Gift” Bound in Red Tape, http://www.accessmed-
msf.org/prod/publications.asp?scntid=1292003916443&contenttype=PARA& (last visited Nov. 17, 2006). 
For a model arrangement, see Condon & Sinha, supra  note 13. 
 56 For detail on the legal and administrative burdens and obstacles to legislating, see DFID HEALTH 
SYSTEMS RESOURCE CENTRE, ACCESS TO MEDICINES IN UNDER-SERVED MARKETS: WHAT ARE THE 
IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, TRADE AND DRUG REGISTRATION 
POLICY? 6 (2004), available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/dfidsynthesispaper.pdf [hereinafter 
DFID]. 
 57 Id. 
 58 For links to the implementing legislation and supporting documents, see Legislation to Allow for the 
Export of Pharmaceuticals Produced Under Compulsory License,  
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/cl-export-legislation.html  (last visited July 16, 2006). The domestic 
legislation enacted in most, if not all, countries has also been criticized. See, e.g., Neither Expeditious, 
surpa note 52, at 2; Matthew Rimmer, The Jean Chretien Pledge to Africa Act: Patent Law and 
Humanitarian Aid , 15(7) EXP. OPIN. THER. PATENTS 889 (2005). 
 59 See Rimmer, supra note 58, at 905; TRIPS Council Remains Divided on Public Health Amendment, 
9(36) BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG. (2005), available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/05-10-
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¶19 To date, there have not been any notifications to the TRIPS Council regarding the 
issuance of a compulsory licence.  This is not surprising, as prior to 2005, developing 
country members such as India and Brazil could produce and supply generic versions of 
patented drugs without the need for the issuance of a compulsory license.60  TRIPS, 
however, is playing an increasingly bigger role and becoming more important in the 
expansion of access to medicines and public health in the developing world following the 
expiration of certain transitory flexibilities and implementation periods in January 2005.61  
TRIPS now has the potential to become a barrier to access to affordable new medicines 
and vaccines as the rules on compulsory licensing become operational for a number of 
developing country Members who are now subject to totality of the TRIPS Agreement.62  
The practical result of this is that TRIPS now affects generic producers’ ability to provide 
existing medicines for developing countries without sufficient manufacturing 
capabilities.63  Thus, developed nations passing the necessary legislation operationalizing 
the Implementation Agreement takes on even more importance. 
¶20 Perhaps more worrisome with regards to the development of essential medicines in 
the developing world is the addition of intellectual property provisions in bilateral and 
regional free trade agreements (FTAs) requiring signatories to advance protection beyond 
                                                                                                                                                 
26/story3.htm;  see also  MSF, THE JEAN CHRÉTIEN, PLEDGE TO AFRICA ACT OR CANADA’S ATTEMPT TO 
PROVIDE MEDICINES FOR THE POOR (2002), available at 
http://www.msf.ca/tour2006/press/images/BRIEF_jcpa.pdf . 
 60 Several countries, including India, Malaysia, Indonesia, Cameroon, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and 
Zambia, have all in the past is sued compulsory licenses for the importation of generic drugs or authorized 
local production of generic drugs for patented AIDS drugs. MSF, WILL THE LIFELINE OF AFFORDABLE 
MEDICINES FOR POOR COUNTRIES BE CUT? CONSEQUENCES OF MEDICINES PATENTING IN INDIA (2005), 
http://www.msf.fr/documents/base/2005-02-01-msf.pdf [hereinafter MSF 2005]. 
 61 These transitional periods are of the utmost importance in terms of access to medicines in the 
developing world, as the delayed implementation of TRIPS allows several countries that possess the ability 
to cheaply produce copies of patented drugs and sell them for much lower prices than the patent holder. 
This practice became more difficult as of January 1, 2005, when the leading generic manufacturing nations 
(including India) became subject to TRIPS. As a result, compulsory licensing may be less effective in the 
absence of a generic industry. UK CIPR, supra note 18 (“[After January 1, 2005,] without special 
arrangements, the possibility of compulsory licensing being a vehicle for price reductions will be more 
limited than at present, even in the few technologically advanced developing countries. For most countries, 
the only feasible supplier may be the patentee (or his licensee).”). 
 62 Many believe the introduction of generic competition reduces the price of drugs. For instance, the 
price of one AIDS treatment reportedly dropped by 82% in Brazil after the government began producing 
generics. MSF 2004, supra  note 1, at 2 (“The single most important factor in forcing down the prices of 
medicines is generic competition. The lowest price of an AIDS drug combination plummeted from more 
than US $10,000 per patient per year to less than US $200 between 2000 and 2004.”). For a table showing 
the prices of drugs pre- and post- generic competition, see id. at 3. It has been estimated that the post-2005 
cost of new drugs will rise by 200%. F.M. Scherer & Jayashree Watal, Post-Trips Options for Access to 
Patented Medicines in Developing Countries 7-8 (Comm’n on Macroeconomics and Heath,  Working 
Paper No. WG4:1, 2001). See also  Balasubramniam, supra  note 8, at 137-38; DFID, supra note 56, 12-13; 
contra , Carol C. Adelman et al., The Full Cost of HIV/AIDS Treatment, HUDSON INST . 8-9 (2nd ed. 2005) 
(finding the majority of patented drug prices to be within the range of  lower than generic/copy drug prices 
for both single dose and combination AIDS drugs) [hereinafter Adelman, et al., The Full Cost of HIV/AIDS 
Treatment].  
 63 That being said, patents are crucial to the development of drugs: “Without patents, existing anti-AIDS 
drugs would not have been produced. Without patents, new and better drugs that are needed to overcome 
the increasing resistance of the AIDS virus would not be developed.” WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
ORGANISATION, STRIKING A BALANCE: THE PATENT SYSTEM AND ACCESS TO DRUGS AND HEALTH CARE, 
WIPO Publication No. 491(E), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/patents/491/wipo_pub_491.pdf [hereinafter WIPO No. 491(E)]. 
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the minimum standards required by TRIPS (the so-called TRIPS-Plus provisions).64  Not 
only is the addition of the so-called “TRIPS-Plus” part of a larger strategy to achieve 
outcomes which are not feasible multilaterally, but it is also apparent that such provisions 
are in response to the powerful and persistent lobbying efforts of the pharmaceutical 
industry. 65  These provisions have the potential to hinder access to essential medicines by 
limiting access to the flexibilities that currently exist in TRIPS to protect public health.  
Such TRIPS-consistent flexibilities that are now forming part of many FTA provisions 
limiting the flexibilities granted in TRIPS and potentially curtailing possible government 
responses to public health crises include, inter alia, restricting the conditions for the 
issuance of compulsory licensing, extending the period of data exclusivity and other 
protections, extending the patent term and ‘new use’ patents (so called ‘evergreening’), 
preventing parallel importation, and linking the ‘market approval’ of a drug to patent 
status (requiring drug and health regulatory agencies to intersect with national patent 
offices and undertake some form of oversight duties).66  These provisions are, however, 
WTO-consistent as the standards elucidated in TRIPS are simply minimum standards, 
and Members are allowed to grant greater protection to intellectual property rights if they 
so desire.67 
¶21 Thus, despite the Doha Round’s merits in bringing the issue of the international 
health to the fore, serious gaps must still be addressed in the regulation of intellectual 
property at the global level. 68  The impact of the Implementation Agreement may be 
debated,69 but even if intellectual property provisions contained in TRIPS were 
                                                 
 64 For more on the development of TRIPS-Plus provisions, see Bryan Mercurio, TRIPS-Plus Provisions 
in RTAs: Recent Trends, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM (Lorand Bartels 
& Federico Ortino eds., 2006). 
 65 See REPORT OF THE INDUSTRY FUNCTIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS FOR TRADE POLICY MATTERS (IFAC-3), THE US-CENTRAL AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT : 
THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROVISIONS (2004), 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA_Reports/asset_upload_file571_5
945.pdf.  
 66 See, e.g., Mercurio, supra  note 64; Peter Drahos, Expanding Intellectual Property’s Empire: the Role 
of FTAs, GRAIN, Nov. 2003, http://www.grain.org/rights_files/drahos-fta-2003-en.pdf. 
 67 Article 4 of the TRIPS agreement states that a Member who grants “any advantage, favour, privilege 
or immunity” to the nationals of any other country (whether that country be a Member of the WTO/TRIPS 
or not) must accord the same treatment to the nationals of other Members of TRIPS. The clause operates in 
a relatively unqualified way because, unlike art. XXIV of the GATT, which may serve to exempt FTAs 
from the operation of MFN, TRIPS does not contain a similar provision; thus, the principle of MFN applies 
to FTAs. Therefore, if enough FTAs are negotiated containing TRIPS-plus provisions, these provisions will 
essentially become the new minimum standard from which any future WTO trade round will proceed. For a 
detailed analysis, see Drahos, supra note 66.  See also  FREDERICK ABBOTT, THE DOHA DECLARATION ON 
THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE CONTRADICTORY TREND IN BILATERAL AND 
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS (2004), http://www.quno.org/geneva/pdf/economic/Occassional/TRIPS-
Public -Health-FTAs.pdf. 
 68 It is important to note that the issue of TRIPS and public health is now firmly on the international 
agenda, with the topic regularly discussed and debated at intra- and inter-institutional meetings. For more 
on the importance of this development see Frederick M. Abbott, Toward a New Era of Objective 
Assessment in the Field of TRIPS and Variable Geometry for the Preservation of Multilateralism 8 J. of 
Int’l Econ. L. 77 (2005). 
 69 For instance, on the day of the Implementation Agreement (August 30, 2003) the WTO headlined a 
press release “Decision Removes Final Patent Obstacle to Cheap Drug Imports,” Oxfam titled their press 
release “Flawed WTO Drugs Deal Will do Little to Secure Future Access to Medicines in Developing 
Countries,” and the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Association stated in their press 
release, “Now it is time to focus on the real access barriers.” See Press Release, WTO, Decision Removes 
Final Patent Obstacle to Cheap Drug Imports (Aug. 30, 2003), available at  
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completely pro-developing country, or if the (mostly western) NGOs purporting to 
represent the interests of the developing world received everything that they demanded of 
the WTO, would the continuing health crises in the developing world be alleviated? 
Would the health crises even be minimized? The pharmaceutical industry and the patent 
provisions in TRIPS have been subjected to much criticism over the last decade and 
charges that they are to blame for the lack of access to medicine in developing countries 
are not uncommon.  However, there is strong evidence which shows that patent 
protection of pharmaceuticals and TRIPS alone are not impeding access to essential 
medicines in developing countries.  In fact, this article argues that IPRs have not even 
been a significant factor when the situation is objectively assessed and considered in its 
entirety. 
III. CRITICAL ISSUES INVOLVED IN SOLVING THE ACCESS TO MEDICINE PROBLEM 
¶22 Even under the best circumstances, merely alleviating the public health crisis in 
many parts of the developing world to a noticeable degree will be difficult to achieve.  
The situation requires international cooperation on a massive scale to not only ensure that 
the developing world has access to essential medicines but to also create incentives to 
stimulate (or directly fund) research and development into new medicines and vaccines to 
treat the diseases primarily affecting the developing world. 
¶23 It is unfortunate that several high profile NGOs have concentrated their effort in 
blaming the pharmaceutical industry and the patent regime for worsening the crises.70  
While these groups have spent significant monetary resources and intellectual effort 
directing much of the debate over the access to essential medicines in the developing 
world on the issue of patent protection of pharmaceuticals to the actions of the 
pharmaceutical industry and the patent regime, the constant accusations and resulting 
publicity have not helped the situation and, to the contrary, have been highly divisive, 
arguably lengthening the time between the Doha Ministerial and the implementation of 
the Implementation Agreement and obscuring longstanding impediments to improving 
the lives and health of millions.  In order to control the problem and even hope to 
alleviate suffering, all interested parties must realize that patent protection is only one of 
many factors that play a role in the health of the developing world and other critical 
factors, such as poor living conditions, the lack of medical facilities and proper 
                                                                                                                                                 
www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres03_e/pr350_e.htm; Press Release, Oxfam, Flawed WTO Drugs Deal 
Will do Little to Secure Future Access to Medicines in Developing Countries (Aug. 30, 2003), available at 
www.oxfam.org/en/news/pressreleases2003/pr030830_wto_final.htm;  Press Release, European Federation 
of Pharmaceutical Industries and Association, EFPIA Statement on Compulsory License for Export 
(“Paragraph 6” of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS & Public Health) (Aug. 30, 2003), available at 
www.efpia.org/3_press/20030830.htm.  
 70 See, e.g., MSF, Publications on Patents, http://www.accessmed-
msf.org/prod/morepublications.asp?catid=1&subcatid=185&status=182 (last visited Dec. 3, 2006); MSF, 
WTO TRIPS Agreement, http://www.accessmed-
msf.org/prod/morepublications.asp?catid=1&subcatid=185&status=182 (last visited Jan. 3, 2007); MSF, 
Pricing Policy, http://www.accessmed-
msf.org/prod/morepublications.asp?catid=1&subcatid=187&status=182 (last visited Jan. 3, 2007); OXFAM, 
DARE TO LEAD: PUBLIC HEALTH AND COMPANY WEALTH (2001), 
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/health/downloads/daretolead.pdf. 
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infrastructure, malnutrition, and the lack of means for distributing and administrating 
medicine, must be addressed in order to alleviate the public health crises.71 
¶24 Somewhere in the past decade, important facts such as the appallingly low levels of 
medical infrastructure in developing nations, inadequate levels of foreign assistance and 
seeming lack of political will in some developing countries to alleviate the suffering were 
marginalized as the debate focused on TRIPS.72  Thus, even though infrastructure, aid 
from developed countries and political will in developing countries is not even remotely 
adequate to ease the worsening health situation in the developing world, the international 
debate diverted key monetary resources, intellectual efforts and negotiating capacity on a 
secondary issue.  One noted expert concludes: “AIDS activists have done a huge 
disservice to the problem of providing relief to people in the developing world by 
directing a disproportionate focus on the patent issue.”73 
¶25 Crises such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and others gripping much of the developing 
world are a very real and escalating problem in many developing nations.  But the fact is 
that if patent regulation did not exist, much of the developing world would still lack 
access to essential medicines.  Importantly, 95% of the pharmaceutical products on the 
WHO Essential Drug List (such as medicines to treat AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria) are 
off-patent and, due to flexibilities contained in TRIPS and extended by Paragraph 7 of the 
Declaration and waivers granted in 2002 by the Council for TRIPS, the grace period for 
LDCs delaying implementation of Sections 5 (patents) and 7 (confidential information) in 
relation to pharmaceutical products and the marketing rights thereof have been extended 
until 2016; meaning LDCs do not currently have to provide patent protection for 
pharmaceuticals.74 
¶26 To illustrate, as of 2003, of the fifteen antiretroviral (ARV) drugs used for treating 
AIDS, patent coverage is below 20%, with 172 patents out of the 759 that could 
theoretically apply.75  Moreover, of the 52 African nations, only South Africa has patent 
                                                 
 71 It is conceded, however, that combination/cocktail drugs have proven the most effective means of 
controlling AIDS and, given that the pharmaceutical companies are normally only able to combine their 
own drugs (although this is beginning to change as pharmaceutical companies see the benefit of forming 
joint ventures with rival companies), patent protection may be preventing another potential treatment from 
coming onto the market. Fortunately, generic Indian manufacturers who were not stifled by IPRs have 
mixed drugs with some success and the innovative pharmaceutical industry is showing signs of 
cooperation.   
 72 See, e.g., G.A. Res. S-26/2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-26/2 (June 27, 2001). For instance, it has been 
estimated that researching and developing a new malaria treatment requires $300-$500 million dollars more 
per year than it currently receives.   
 73 Bruce A. Lehman, Globalization's Impact on International Trade and Intellectual Property Law: 
Intellectual Property Rights as a Trade, Health and Economic Development Issue, 17 ST . JOHN'S J. 417, 
419-20 (2003). 
 74 See Doha Declaration, supra  note 22, at para 7; see also  Press Release, WTO, Extension of the 
Transition Period under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement for Least-Developed Country Members for 
Certain Obligations with Respect to Pharmaceutical Product, Decision of the Council for TRIPS of 
27 June 2002 (June 28, 2002), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres02_e/pr301_e.htm [hereinafter 
WTO, Extension of Transition Period]; General Council, Least-Developed Country Members--Obligations 
under Article 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement with Respect to Pharmaceutical Products, WT/L/478 (July 12, 
2002).  On June 27, 2002, the Council for TRIPS extended the transition period during which LDCs do not 
have to provide patent protection for pharmaceuticals.  WTO, Extension of Transition Period. The Council 
also approved a waiver that exempts LDCs having to provide exclusive marketing rights for any new drugs 
in the period when they do not provide patent protection.  Id. 
 75 Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), Health Care in the Developing 
World: Intellectual Property and Access to AIDS Drugs, 
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protection for more than half of its AIDS drugs, with 15 patents out of a possible 16.  
Importantly, 25% of the countries provide no patents and the rest have an average of 4 
patented drugs, with no patents on more than a dozen different triple-therapy cocktails 
used to combat HIV/AIDS.76  Thus, while the majority of African countries do not patent 
most ARV drugs used to treat AIDS and the majority of countries of sub-Saharan Africa 
do not have any patent protection for any of the drugs, the AIDS epidemic continues to 
infect and kill millions of people per year on the continent. 
¶27 Interestingly, several members of the medical community also contest the view that 
patent protection has exacerbated the HIV/AIDS crisis or significantly impeded access to 
essential medicines.  For instance, a widely cited study conducted in 2001 by Amir 
Attaran and Lee Gillespie-White and published in the Journal of the American Medical 
Association states: 
[It appears that] patents and patent law are not a major barrier to treatment 
access in and of themselves.77 
¶28 Yet the developing world continues to suffer without adequate supply of the needed 
medicines, begging the question what are the primary causes of, or more appropriately, 
what are the barriers to resolving, the continuing crises and lack of access to life-saving 
medicines in the developing world.  This article suggests that there are two main 
solutions for the ongoing public health crises in the developing world: 
(1) access to existing medicines must increase; and 
(2) incentives to promote the development of new medicines and vaccines must 
increase. 
¶29 Part IV elaborates upon these two issues by addressing several barriers currently 
present and offering indicatives and suggestions in an attempt to alleviate the suffering 
and resolve the public health crises. 
IV.  POLICY BASED SOLUTIONS/INITIATIVES AND THEIR VIABILITY 
¶30 The public health crisis in the developing world is a global problem and any 
potential solution cannot be borne by one entity.  Instead, the problem requires a 
commitment from all members of the international community to provide funding and 
strategic planning to improve the currently insufficient medical infrastructure of many 
developing world countries.  The burden cannot be placed solely on governments of 
developing or developed countries, on pharmaceutical companies or on international 
organisations, such as the WHO.  Rather, those entities as well as research groups, the 
media and even the citizenry of developed nations all must participate as vital actors.  
This section examines how these entities can all play a pivotal role in easing the suffering 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://world.phrma.org/ip.access.aids.drugs.html.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2007) [hereinafter Ph RMA 2003]. 
 76 Id.; see also  INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INSTITUTE (IIPI), PATENT PROTECTION AND 
ACCESS TO HIV/AIDS PHARMACEUTICALS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 52 (2000), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/studies/pdf/iipi_hiv.pdf (finding the substantial majority of 
pharmaceuticals to combat HIV/AIDS have never been patented in most African countries). 
 77 Amir Attaran & Lee Gillespie-White, Do Patents for Antiretroviral Drugs Constrain Access to AIDS 
Treatment in Africa?, 286 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1881, 1881-92 (2001).  The authors focused on capacity 
relating problems and concluded that “patents generally do not appear to be a substantial barrier to 
antiretroviral treatment access in Africa today.” Id. at 1891. 
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in the developing world.  At the outset, it must be noted that as situations differ for every 
region and for every disease it is not possible to design one encompassing solution to the 
problem.  Therefore, the following merely offers general indicatives and suggestions 
which should be further studied and employed as the situation dictates. 
A. Global commitment from developed countries 
¶31 The suffering in the developing world will not be alleviated without a global 
commitment to finance health improvements.  As developing countries historically do not 
have the necessary resources and/or will to finance such an initiative, advanced 
industrialized countries must take on more responsibility and lead the way in funding the 
restructuring of the current inadequate medical infrastructure that exists in so many 
developing countries.  One funding initiative governments could take is to raise general 
revenues through the wide range of available tax instruments or shift financing from 
other domestic areas to fund this global initiative.78  Practically speaking, however, 
neither option is particularly appealing as governments are hesitant to raise taxes or shift 
funds from certain domestic areas to any international effort due to potential opposition 
by their citizens or embarrassment by opposing political parties. 
¶32 In this regard, the media and international organisations – such as the WHO – may 
be able to play a significant role in raising awareness of the extent to which widespread 
epidemics ravage much of the developing world.  Unfortunately, for many in the 
developed world, epidemics such as malaria and tuberculosis seem so far removed from 
their highly industrialized societies, where such diseases do not exist or are controlled to 
acceptable levels, that often the awareness generated does not arouse sufficient empathy 
to the cause.  This apathy, and corresponding shortage of international funding, is a major 
contributing factor to the ongoing public health crises in the developing world.  This fact 
led Attaran and Gillespie-White to conclude that “the extreme dearth of international aid 
finance, rather than patents, is most to blame for the lack of antiretroviral treatment in 
Africa.”79 
¶33 On the other hand, there is clear evidence that both governments and citizens of the 
industrialized world can be generously responsive to public health crises.  For instance, 
one need only look back at the international response to the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami 
disaster, where worldwide broadcasting of the sudden devastation resulted in billions of 
dollars of aid donations within a matter of weeks to fund the provision of necessary 
medicines, food, clean water and other relief efforts.80  The large-scale international 
outpouring of aid was no doubt largely a result of people visualising the suffering of 
                                                 
 78 For instance, the often posed, so-called Tobin Tax (a tax on cross border currency trades across 
borders) could be implemented nationally by industrialized countries (but enforced multi-nationally) to 
raise an estimated $100-$300 billion per year. However, in addition to a lack of support within the citizenry 
of most nations, leading developed countries also oppose the Tobin Tax as it would reduce the currency 
exchange market, the consequences of which are unknown. 
 79 Attaran & Gillespie-White, supra  note 77, at 1891. 
 80 See, for example, the responses of the British Red Cross, Boxing Day Tsunami, 2004: Background 
Information, http://www.redcross.org.uk/standard.asp?id=46361 (last visited Jan. 2, 2007), USAID, USAID 
Rebuilds Lives After the Tsunami, http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia_near_east/tsunami/ (last visited 
Jan. 2, 2007), Asia Relief, Indonesia Floods, http://asiarelief.win.aplus.net/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2007) and 
MSF/DWB, MSF Operations & Financial Overview: One Year After The Indian Ocean Tsunami Disaster, 
http://www.doctorswithoutborders-usa.org/news/sasia_tsunami/index.cfm (last visited Jan. 2, 2007). 
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millions of displaced people and the death of hundreds of thousands of people in the days 
following the disaster.81  Perhaps if there was extensive coverage of public health issues 
in the media informing of the urgency to control widespread epidemics such as 
HIV/AIDS and malaria, a similar outpouring of aid relief may be possible.  At the very 
least, the campaign may lead to a positive and willing response by citizens of developed 
countries to support government actions to raise taxes or redistribute domestic funding 
for this international initiative.82 
¶34 Developed countries do currently contribute to the fight against diseases in a 
number of ways, including partially financing medical programmes such as the Global 
Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria83 While such initiatives are certainly a step 
in the right direction, developed countries have been criticized for their lack of 
commitment to the effort.84  In this regard, not only mus t the international community 
commit to increased financing and aid efforts, but perhaps more importantly, it needs to 
actually execute and fulfill its existing aid promises and commitments.  Increased levels 
of properly targeted, long-term aid would go a long way towards alleviating the public 
health crises while at the same time assisting countries in working to end economic 
dependency. 85  In fact, the situation would improve if countries merely fulfill their 
commitment to providing an amount equal to 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) on 
official development assistance (ODA).86  Increased aid, however, will not materialize 
without effective monitoring coupled with the minimisation of waste and a reduction in 
corruption; in other words, the international community will only increase their financial 
obligations and commitment to the developing world when they are confident the aid will 
be effective.87 
¶35 Closely tied to the above is the fact that a lack of coordination of international aid 
currently impedes the efficient and effective use of aid.88  The need for large-scale, long 
                                                 
 81 See sources cited supra note 80 for facts, figures and stories of the disaster and relief efforts. 
 82 It has been suggested that economic prosperity or recession may play a part  in countries increasing 
aid–or meeting their targets–to the developing need world. In this regard, a well-functioning global 
economy can be viewed as a precondition to increased aid. See UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra  note 
1, at 94. 
 83 The Global Fund is a partnership between governments, civil society, the private sector and affected 
communities created to support international health financing. The Global Fund has, to date, committed 
$4.9 billion in 131 countries to support aggressive interventions against all three. For more information, see 
The Global Fund, http://www.theglobalfund.org/en (last visited Jan. 2, 2007). 
 84 See, e.g ., Frederick M. Abbott, Commentary: The International Intellectual Property Order Enters the 
21st Century, 29 VANDERBILT J. TRANSN’L L. 471 (1996). 
 85 See generally UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra  note 1, and specifically the recommendations on 
pages 147-49. 
 86 This now widely cited figure was first pledged in a 1970 General Assembly Resolution and has been 
affirmed many times, including at the International Conference on Financing for Development in 
Monterrey, Mexico at paragraph 42 and at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg 
at page 52. In 2004, the total ODA to developing countries increased 4.6% from the previous year to $78.6 
billion, a figure which represents only 0.25% of Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members' 
combined GNI. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Official Development 
Assistance increases further--but 2006 Targets Still a Challenge, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/3/0,2340,en_2649_201185_34700611_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Jan. 2, 
2007).  
 87 UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra  note 1, at 104. 
 88 A number of efforts also discount the need for effective community inclusion, participation and 
empowerment in any international efforts. See, e.g., id. at 101. However, a WHO study found that the more 
successful aid efforts involve the local community and most also respond to an area of need, on the request 
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term assistance and aid is well known and understood, but the present system of 
distributing aid and assistance is disparate, wasteful and lacking transparency. 89  The 
current system sees groups and organisations competing with each other and duplicating 
technical, research and on the ground efforts.90  In short, useful information and analysis 
is not well known or published and experiences within organisations, nations or regions 
are not transferred to others.  Not only does this damage and marginalize aid efforts, but 
it also makes it hard to get adequate levels of assistance and even maintain sufficient 
quality of drugs.91  A properly administered system which increases coordination and 
transparency of activities would improve the situation by combining resources and efforts 
to maximize efficiency and targeted assistance.  While financing is certainly imperative 
to controlling the pubic health crisis in the developing world, it is not the only global 
initiative in which nations must engage.  Other positive actions that developed countries 
and international bodies such as the WHO and UN could take to control the crises in the 
developing world include negotiations and planning efforts with the heads of the affected 
developing nations to devise strategic plans to distribute funds efficiently and effectively 
in those affected countries.92 
B. Political commitment from developing nations 
¶36 The burden and responsibility for alleviating the public health crisis in the 
developing world should not fall solely on developed country governments.  On the 
contrary, important to any effort is a concurrent political commitment from the 
governments of the developing nations in the midst of widespread epidemics to control 
and alleviate the problem.  At present, it is clear that there is an inadequate level of 
national commitment of developing country governments to prioritize healthcare.93  Like 
many of the other barriers listed in this section, the lack of commitment transcends 
                                                                                                                                                 
of the beneficiary country. See generally WHO, GUIDELINES FOR DRUG DONATIONS (1999), 
http://www.drugdonations.org/eng/richtlijnen/eng_guidelinesdrugdonation.pdf.  
 89 See ROY WIDDUS & KATHERINE WHITE, COMBATING DISEASES A SSOCIATED WITH POVERTY: 
FINANCING STRATEGIES FOR PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT AND THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS 23 (Abr. ver. 2004), available at 
http://www.globalforumhealth.org/filesupld/ippph/CombatingDiseases.pdf; UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT 
2005, supra  note 1, at 5-6, 30, 42-45, 63. 
 90 For a specific example, see Widdus & White, supra  note 89, at 21-22. 
 91 See UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra  note 1, at 41, 100; Patrice Troullier et al., Drug 
Development for Neglected Diseases: A Deficient Market and a Public Policy Failure, 359 THE LANCET 
2188 (2002); see generally WARREN A. KAPLAN, ET  AL., THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY INTERVENTIONS ON 
PHARMACEUTICAL ACCESS AND QUALITY: WHAT IS THE EVIDENCE AND WHERE ARE THE GAPS IN OUR 
KNOWLEDGE? (2003), available at 
http://dcc2.bumc.bu.edu/richardl/RPM+_Project/Regulation&QA/Regulation-evidence-Feb2003.doc; 
WHO CMH, MACROECONOMICS AND HEALTH: INVESTING IN HEALTH FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT  
(2001), available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidcmh/CMHReport.pdf [hereinafter WHO CMH 2001]. 
 92 A possible avenue for the distribution of funding could be to establish domestic manufacturers in non-
producing countries to save these countries from relying on TRIPS mechanisms for imports of generic 
versions of drugs. However, there is evidence to suggest that this would not be a viable expenditure of 
funding due to the need for the drugs to meet an internationally recognized quality standard, which would 
make it difficult for these producers to offer competitive prices. See BROOK BAKER, DFID HEALTH SYS. 
RES. CT R., PROCESSES AND ISSUES FOR IMPROVING ACCESS TO MEDICINES: WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY TO 
UTILISE TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES IN NON-PRODUCING COUNTRIES (2004), available at 
http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/docs/Baker_TRIPS_Flex.pdf. 
 93 See UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra note 1, at 29. 
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boundaries and depends upon a number of factors.  Reasons for the lack of prioritization, 
however, include a lack of political will by policymakers, blatant corruption at every 
level of the public sector,94 a lack of health infrastructure or even pre-conditions 
necessary for adequate healthcare, restrictive donor programs, large scale debt 
repayments, and strict conditions for loans from international financial institutions that 
may have the effect of further precluding basic social service needs of citizens.95 
¶37 The lack of political will of developing countries combined with a lack of capacity 
to deliver proper healthcare solutions is the most prominent detriment to resolving, 
alleviating or even lessening the health crises.96  At present, even when essential vaccines 
and medicines are heavily discounted or even donated to developing markets, the cost of 
transportation, storage and administration of vaccines and medicines often cost more than 
the drugs themselves.97 
¶38 Evidence indicates that the majority of developing countries and LDCs lack the 
economic foundation to sustain a properly functioning public health climate, which 
includes the costs of purchasing, storing, transporting, and administering needed 
medicines.98  For instance, LDCs, on average, spend approximately US$11 per capita on 
health99 – as compared with $US93 for lower middle- income nations and $US1,907 for 
developed nations – thus, even when pharmaceutical companies donate necessary drugs 
                                                 
 94 In 2006, Forbes magazine named Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, the president of troubled 
Equatorial Guinea, as the eighth wealthiest leader in the world with an estimated wealth of $600 million. In 
addition, while oil was discovered in 1995, little money has reportedly been released outside the Obiang 
family and the country has declined in almost all UN standards over the last decade. It must also be noted 
that American-owned Riggs Bank was fined for not reporting possible money laundering following the 
deposit of over $700 million following the discovery of oil. The money was released to Obiang. Obiang 
and his immediate family also recently owned two multi-million dollar homes in Maryland and the 
Obiang’s son reportedly paid $700,000 to rent Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen’s yacht, Tatoosh. Luisa 
Kroll, Fortunes of Kings, Queens and Dictators, Forbes.com, May 4, 2006, 
http://www.forbes.com/billionaires/2006/05/04/rich-kings-dictators_cz_lk_0504royals.html. It is also 
widely believed that former Indonesian President Suharto embezzled more than $10 billion during his 33-
year dictatorship; Zaire’s (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) former leader Mobutu Sese Seko, 
overthrown in a 1997 revolt, was reputed to be worth between $4-8 billion; Former Philippine Ferdinand 
Marcos apparently embezzled $5 billion in government funds during his 20 years in power. Less than $1 
billion was ever recovered after his overthrow. See Arik Hesseldahl, How Dictators Manage Their Billions, 
Forbes.com, June 22, 2000, http://www.forbes.com/2000/06/22/feat.html. 
 95 For instance, the IMF has repeatedly recommended that countries limit their health expenditures as a 
means to combat inflation as a condition to a loan. UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra  note 1, at 96. 
 96 The TRIPS Agreement provides significant flexibilities and wide discretion for determining public 
health policy and even the conditions of compulsory licensing laws. See SISULE MUSUNGU & CECILIA OH, 
THE USE OF FLEXIBILITIES IN TRIPS BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: CAN THEY PROMOTE ACCESS TO 
MEDICINES (2005), available at  www.who.int/intellectualproperty/studies/TRIPSFLEXI.pdf.   
 97 See Mercurio, supra note 16, at 246-47. 
 98 For statistics on worldwide poverty, see Shaohua Chen & Martin Ravallion, How Have the World’s 
Poorest Fared Since the Early 1980s? , 19(2) World Bank Res. Observer 141–70 (2004). 
 99 In some countries, the situation is even more dire. For instance, in Cote d’Ivoire, a discounted 
treatment for AIDS cost $3.48 per day, but in a country where the average GDP per day is $1.94 and donor 
assistance only adds $0.03 per day, the price still makes the drug unattainable. UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT 
2005, supra  note 1, at 65. WIPO states: “Even reducing the price of HIV/AIDS treatments to cover the 
costs of basic manufacturing and distribution alone–as was recently done in a number of countries hardest 
hit by the crisis –still keeps the cost of annual treatments at between $350 and $600 per year. These prices, 
which are similar to the cost of generic versions of the same drugs and make no provision for recouping the 
cost of research and development, are still above the annual per capita incomes of some countries with high 
levels of HIV/AIDS.” WIPO No. 491(E) , supra  note 63. 
Vol. 5:1] Bryan Mercurio 
21 
to these countries, these developing countries still cannot afford the storage and 
administrative costs associated with receiving the drugs.100 
¶39 The poor level of existing infrastructure in many developing countries is evidenced 
by inadequate health facilities, lack of hospital beds and laboratories, lack of trained 
medical and laboratory staff101 and incomplete or non-existent drug distribution 
systems.102  Inefficient use of aid and resources, poor management and little oversight of 
existing programs is also a large impediment to maintaining a properly functioning public 
health system.103  Additionally, it must be noted that in order to see any meaningful 
progress, significant monetary resources must also be expended to meet the most 
fundamental of needs for food and clean water to remove some of the conditions leading 
to illness and disease and to build the necessary medical infrastructure to enable the 
provision of adequate health services.104 
¶40 Developing countries do not have the monetary resources to combat these health 
problems.105  As illustrated throughout this article, developing countries need assistance 
in alleviating poverty, minimizing social disruptions, overcoming inconsistent donor aid 
and encouraging research and development on diseases primarily afflicting the 
developing world in order to eliminate or at the very least lessen the burden and create a 
situation more conducive to the provision of health services.  Developing countries, 
however, can help themselves in this process.  The first step in finding a long term 
solution to the problem is for governments in the developing world stricken with health 
crises to adopt a national medicines policy. 106  The design and implementation of this 
                                                 
 100 Alan Moran, Trade Laws and Pharmaceuticals, 53(4) INST . PUB. AFF. REV. 25, 26 (2001); WHO 
CMH 2001, supra  note 91; INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (ICC), FURTHER VIEWS ON CROSS 
BORDER COMPULSORY LICENSING 8 (2002), available at  
http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/icc_paper_aug03_e.pdf.  There is “increasing international 
agreement that $30 per capita represents the lower bound [needed to provide health services].” UN 
MILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra  note 1, at 63. The price of the cheapest generic triple cocktail to combat 
HIV/AIDS, on offer by Indian manufacturer Cipla, costs $350 per person per year.  See PhRMA 2002, 
supra  note 75 (PhRMA said the marketing and selling of drugs without any price differential to developing 
countries is cruel and costs lives. One example of this is the marketing of a Hepatitis C treatment at 
$30,000 a year. This makes the drug unaffordable to most governments and creates a situation whereby 
only the wealthy citizens can afford treatment.); MSF 2005, supra  note 60. 
101 The shortage of trained medical practitioners, nurses, aids, technicians, pharmacists, and pharmacy 
technicians is “a growing problem that, if unaddressed, threatens to undermine all efforts to strengthen 
health systems and improve healthcare in much of the developing world.” UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, 
supra  note 1, at 30. 
 102 See, e.g., UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra  note 1, at 80-81. 
 103 Prescription practices in several developing countries have been referred to as wasteful and 
dangerous. For example, for every $30 of medicine reaching its target (through donations or otherwise), 
$15 is squandered and $3 more is lost on non-compliance by patients. See id. at 86, 88. 
 104 See generally WORLD BANK, IMPROVING HEALTH, NUTRITION AND POPULATION OUTCOMES IN SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA (2005). In the United Nations Millennium Declaration, the UN set eight goals for 
development (the Millennium Development Goals or MDGs) and an agenda for improving the human 
condition by 2015. See UN Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 49, 
at 4, U.N. Doc. A/55/49 (2000). More on the MDGs can be found at the UN Millennium Project website, 
supra note 10. 
 105 For instance, donations and other aid reportedly account for 52% of Uganda’s national budget. See 
UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra  note 1, at 39. 
 106 The Working Group on Access to Essential Medicines calls this a “necessary component of an 
overall health policy.” UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra  note 1, at 95. The World Bank has defined 
such policies as existing to ensure that “safe and effective drugs of good quality are available and 
affordable to the entire population and that they are rationally used.” Id. at 32 (citing WORLD BANK, 
WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1993: INVESTING IN HEALTH (1993), available at  http://www-
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policy should enable the country to meet its national health needs as well as be simplistic 
enough to enable its realisation. 107  One part of this policy should be a strategy for 
providing essential medicines to citizens.  The importance of such a government policy 
initiative cannot be understated, as policies and programmes initiated to increase access 
to essential medicines or to improve the health of a nation can rarely succeed without the 
support and understanding of all levels of government.  For instance, an ambitious health 
policy without financial support from the government, proper infrastructure and resources 
for training healthcare workers, sufficiently salaried public servants (including but 
certainly not limited to healthcare workers), and the implementation of trade, taxation and 
customs policies creating conditions conducive to smoothly facilitate the improvement of 
health conditions, is likely to fail.108  Moreover, institutions such as the police, the 
judiciary and regulatory bodies must be adequately financed in order to stem rampant 
corruption.  In addition, and importantly, countries must recognize the effect of civil 
instability on public health (displaced citizenry, lack of and poor quality water, food 
shortages and a lack of quality medicine and health services).  Simply stated, efforts 
aimed at resolving the problem of access to essential medicines problems will be fruitless 
if there is a lack of political commitment in the affected developing nation to refocus 
priorities to the health, or even the public, sector.109 
¶41 In order to alleviate the situation, governments must also reorientate their priorities 
and devote more of their scarce resources to meeting the health needs of their citizens.  
The need for such a reorientation is evidenced by relatively low budgeting for and 
expenditures on public health110 which in turn causes shortages of storage facilities, 
transportation networks, and medical equipment and personnel. 111  In addition, in many 
                                                                                                                                                 
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDS_ IBank_Servlet?pcont=details&eid=000009265_3970716142319).  
 107 The Working Group on Access to Essential Medicines states that such a policy must be 
“comprehensive and well-planned” and employ “well-proven principles” based on the essential medicines 
concept as adopted to the needs of the individual country. Effective monitoring of the system’s 
implementation is also crucial to its success. Id. at 95-96. See also  WHO, Framework for Action, 2(1) 
WHO POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON MEDICINES 2 (2002). 
 108 See UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra  note 1, at 32. The Working Group also noted several 
other crucial factors which impact upon the success of a national health policy, namely: the understanding 
of local conditions, long-term (local and international) support from the public and private sectors, the 
prioritization and targeting of access to medicines, and sufficient data and analysis in order to identify and 
target critical problems and barriers. Id. at 95. For a detailed analysis of the problem of healthcare workers 
see WHO, WORKING TOGETHER FOR HEALTH: THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2006 (2006), available at 
http://www.who.int/whr/2006/whr06_en.pdf. 
 109 See WHO 2004, supra note 3. Thus, in many developing countries, wealthy citizens who can afford 
to be treated privately have access to essential medicines while poorer citizens who rely on the public 
health system are deprived of essential medicines and treatments. See UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, 
supra  note 1, at 95. 
 110 See MARTIN FOREMAN, BEYOND OUR MEANS? THE COST OF TREATING HIV/AIDS IN THE 
DEVELOPING WORLD 13 (2000). Compounding the problem is the heavy debt burden of many developing 
nations. For details and figures, see Jubilee Debt Campaign, http://www.jubileedebtcampaign.org.uk (last 
visited Jan. 2, 2007). 
 111 It has been estimated that over 20,000 health professionals annually emigrate from Africa. UN 
MILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra  note 1, at 97. This contributes to the continent spending $4 billion on 
100,000 foreign health workers annually. Id. The reasons behind the emigration include: doctors being 
more skilled and advanced than required by local populations (little intellectual stimulation); poor 
remuneration; lack of incentives to stay or return home; security threats, violence and safety; education for 
children; poor working conditions; oppressive political climate; persecution of intellectuals, discrimination; 
lack of research funding and poor facilities; and limited career options. To reverse this trend, the PHP calls 
for the establishment of full fee-paying universities to train doctors for export, increased training, increased 
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parts of the developing world, corruption on the part of high level government officials or 
poorly paid public servants prevents the drugs from reaching the intended beneficiaries.112  
The impact of corruption in the health network of developing countries is significant and 
costly, both in monetary and human terms, and often prevents even the cheapest of 
treatments from reaching hospitals and patients.113  A reorientation of resources could 
also fund (with the assistance of international aid) increased educational efforts, the 
dissemination of information and in-service training as well as better retention of skilled 
workers (and hopefully decrease the incidence of corruption) and compensation schemes 
for countries that lose health workers. 
¶42 Another significant burden to the access of essential medicines is the fact that 
governments of many developing countries place tariffs, levies, duties and other taxes on 
pharmaceutical drugs and equipment crossing into their borders, thereby significantly 
raising the price of the drugs for patients in their own countries.114  For instance, while the 
average tariff on medicines is 18%, several developing countries and LDCs levy much 
higher rates on medicines entering their respective countries.115  For example, the 
incredibly poor Democratic Republic of the Congo levies a 30% duty on all drugs 
crossing its borders, with further taxes adding at least another 13% to the final price at 
which the drugs can be provided to its citizens.116  Moreover, other countries in the midst 
of public health crises such as India, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Bolivia also impose 
significant tariffs on the importation of pharmaceuticals at 55%, 40%, 34% and 32% 
respectively. 117  Examples of governments that charge excessive sales tax on medicines 
include South Africa (14%), Argentina (21%), Bangladesh (15%), the Dominican 
Republic (28%), Greece (15%) and Turkey (18%).118  Perhaps worst of all is India, 
which, having more than 3 million HIV/AIDS cases and only 17,000 patients being 
regularly treated, charges at least 25% duty on medicines.119  In total, large mark-ups are 
being paid even when tariff rates are low or even zero.120  Incredibly, Kenya, Morocco 
                                                                                                                                                 
salaries and support (housing, transport, etc.) and improving and stimulating the working environment 
(computers, journals, etc.). Id. 
 112 UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra  note 1, at 29, 96-98, 148. For instance, a reported 25% of 
discounted drugs sent to Africa from GlaxoSmithKline between June 2001 and July 2002 failed to reach 
their intended destination. Carol C. Adelman, et al. , Myths and Realities on Prices of AIDS Drugs, HUDSON 
INST . 13 (2004) [hereinafter Adelman, et al., Myths and Realities]. 
 113 See, e.g., FOREMAN, supra  note 110, at 16. 
 114 See, e.g., U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Report of the High Commissioner, 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property on Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (2001). Moreover, border delays 
caused by the facilitation of customs requirements pertaining to tariffs and taxes sometimes result in the 
medicines expiring during the delays or suffering medicinal degradation due to suboptimal storage facilities 
(such as heat, cold, humidity or light). See UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra  note 1, at 80. 
 115 Adelman et al., The Full Cost of HIV/AIDS Treatment, supra  note 62, at 10. 
 116 Adelman et al., Myths and Realities, supra note 112, at 3. 
 117 UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra note 1, at 80. 
 118 See Roger Bate, The Sick are Taxed to Death in Poor Countries, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), May 31, 
2004, available at http://www.fightingmalaria.org/news.php?ID=261 (last visited Jan. 2, 2007). 
 119 See id.; Roger Bate, Taxed to Death, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research: Short 
Publications, Jul. 5, 2006, http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.24624/pub_detail.asp. For more 
details and similar statistics on a number of other nations, see Adelman et al., The Full Cost of HIV/AIDS 
Treatment, supra  note 62, at 10-12. 
 120 For instance, pharmaceuticals enter Sri Lanka, Kenya and Armenia duty free, but the final mark-up in 
those countries due to other taxes and the like is 64%, 54.2% and 87.5%, respectively. See Adelman et al., 
Myths and Realities, supra note 112, at 11. 
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and Peru impose such high levels of tariff and taxes on imported medications that the 
citizens of those countries pay a higher price than the domestic market of the drugs’ 
manufacture – even with price differentiation. 121 
¶43 As a result of the application of tariffs and taxes, the actual price of imported 
medicines in certain developing countries can be over 50% more than the reported value 
of the drug.  To illustrate, when the Clinton Foundation in October 2003 “brokered” a 
deal to lower the price of an HIV drug treatment to US$140 a person a year, the final 
price at which the drugs were provided to citizens was, at its lowest, US$277 in 
Cameroon. 122  In Mozambique, the price was US$389 and in Honduras it was US$426.123 
¶44 Quite obviously, a simple step that every government can take to lower the costs of 
pharmaceutical drugs and equipment is to lower tariffs, levies, duties and other taxes that 
raise the price, and therefore reduce access of the medicines to its populace.124  The 
argument that the countries which levy significant tariffs need the revenues is 
intellectually shallow, short-sighted and reveals the priority the countries have placed on 
public health.  The unnecessary raising of prices of essential medicines through tariffs 
and other taxes is without question unconscionable and a continuing cause of the 
significant loss of life. 
¶45 Reducing tariffs and taxes on the importation of pharmaceuticals and related 
products, as well as improving the distribution of health products and services, and 
maintaining quality of the pharmaceutical supply through reliable testing facilities are 
key issues which governments must address in the fight to improve the lives of many in 
the developing world.125  While most, if not all, developing countries need financial 
assistance to meet these standards, it is clear that “some developing countries have 
aggregate national resources sufficient to meet all the primary healthcare needs of their 
citizens, yet non-health priorities are … given precedence.”126  Unfortunately, the barrier 
of lack of political will demonstrated by the governments of several countries to address 
the public health crises in their countries is a problem for which there is not a clear 
solution.  States cannot generally interfere in the activities of other States and so there is 
little that the governments of other nations can do to stop the mismanagement and 
corruption that is prevalent in many developing countries or to change the cultural views 
that impede access to essential medicines and a proper health infrastructure.127  If much of 
the monopoly that funds the lavish exercises of government officials in developing 
countries is diverted to build medical infrastructure and control the epidemic diseases 
prevalent, then together with commitment from developed countries and the international 
                                                 
 121 See WORLD HEALTH ORG. & HEALTH ACTION INT’L, MEDICINE PRICES — A NEW APPROACH TO 
MEASUREMENT 99-100 (2003), available at 
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/2003/WHO_ EDM_PAR_2003.2.pdf for the price survey methodology. 
 122 Adelman et al., Myths and Realities, supra note 112, at 4.  
 123 Id. at 5.  
 124 See UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra  note 1, at 81 (stating “[t]axes and tariffs on essential 
medicines should be eliminated; they negatively affect affordability and competition”). 
 125 See id. at 63-64. For problems of distribution, particularly to rural areas, and the role of NGOs in 
assisting with their own distribution systems, see id. at 80-81. 
 126 Id. at 39. 
 127 For example, since 2000, only two African countries (Uganda and Botswana) have accepted an offer 
by German pharmaceutical company Boehringer Ingelheim to provide free donations of an anti-retroviral 
drug designed to prevent pregnant women suffering from HIV/AIDS from infecting their unborn babies. 
Geoff Dyer, Only Two African States Take Up Aids Offer, FIN. TIMES, July 14, 2003, at 8. 
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community, the suffering of millions may be eased.  However, considering that in some 
developing nations, governments have not been elected democratically, changing the 
political situation will be difficult.  The most that can be done is for the international 
community to place pressure on these governments to make a commitment to their 
citizens to alleviate the worsening situation.  However, as mentioned above, the lack of 
commitment from developing country governments may be impeding increased aid from 
the developed world. 
¶46 Another method developing countries can utilize to reduce expenditures on drugs is 
regional negotiation using potential purchasing power as an advantage.  While this 
strategy may not be appropriate in every setting, regional negotiating efforts have proven 
to be successful in the eastern Caribbean. 128  It has been noted, however, that such a 
strategy requires, among other things, significant purchasing power, homogeneity of 
members, financial stability, prediction of needs, loyalty and monitoring.129  However, 
even if countries cannot make use of bargaining strengths, all developing countries can 
guarantee price transparency when purchasing drugs and medical supplies to ensure, inter 
alia, competition and rational decision making.130 
¶47 In a perfect world, developing countries would be able to ease the ongoing health 
crises by simply increasing local production of pharmaceuticals but the reality is that this 
involves large capital investment, basic infrastructure capable of supporting such a 
venture, trained technical staff and ongoing costs, i.e., maintaining quality and standards.  
In addition, competition is fierce in the global pharmaceutical market and a developing 
country start-up faces many challenges.  Thus, despite a World Bank report deeming it 
technically feasible for a developing country to build a pharmaceutical industry, it is 
doubtful whether it will be able to compete with the already established industries in 
India and Brazil, among others.131 
¶48 That said, numerous benefits can result from having a local industry and 
establishing such an industry is an option which should be explored by developing 
countries.132  For example, native industries have recently been promoting technology 
                                                 
 128 See UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra note 1, at 77. 
 129 Id. 
 130 For more on the necessary elements of price transparency, see  id. at 76; see also  MSF, UNTANGLING 
THE WEB OF PRICE REDUCTIONS: A PRICING GUIDE FOR THE PURCHASE OF ARVS FOR DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES (8th ed. 2005), available at  http://www.accessmed-
msf.org/documents/untanglingtheweb%208.pdf. 
 131 In order for such a plan to succeed, technology transfers, increased research capacity and increased 
manufacturing capabilities all need to be received or addressed. 
 132 It is worth noting that generic and counterfeit drugs manufactured in developing countries are often 
of substandard quality, dangerous, or even lethal. See WHO, MEDICINES STRATEGY: COUNTRIES AT THE 
CORE 2004-2007 5, 90, 95, 97, 104-06, 143 (2004), available at 
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/2004/WHO_EDM_2004.5.pdf (citing recent WHO assessments that found 
50%-90% of samples of antimalarial drugs failed quality control tests and more than half of ARVs assessed 
did not meet international standards); WHO, WHO Factsheet No. 275, Substandard and Counterfeit 
Medicines, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/2003/fs275/en/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2007); Liza 
Gibson, Drug Regulators Study Global Treaty to Tackle Counterfeit Drugs, 328 BRIT . MED. J. 486 (2004) 
(reporting that counterfeit drugs account for 40 to 50% of all drugs sold in Nigeria and Pakistan). 
International standards have been formulated (and supported by the WHO), such as GMP and International 
Conference on Harmonization (ICH), in an attempt to maintain proper quality and safety standards in the 
production of drugs in the developing world. While such standards are complex and increase production 
costs, they save lives. At present, only a minority of manufacturing facilities are in compliance with the 
standards and the international community must convince manufacturers to meet the standards (for 
example, by procurement agencies insisting the standards be met before purchasing the drugs and by 
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transfers and participating more directly in research and development of diseases 
afflicting the local population. 133  In addition, generic industries in such countries as 
Brazil have acted to lower the price of drugs in recent years.134  Brazil also successfully 
reduced the price of several drugs by threatening to issue a compulsory licence unless the 
patent holder reduced the price of the drug in question. 135  In each instance, the patent 
holder eventually succumbed to the threat because Brazil has the technological capacity 
and well-established generic pharmaceutical industry to manufacture sufficient quantities 
of the drug in question. 136  Without a native industry, such threats would merely be idle 
and could not be acted upon. 137 
¶49 Unfortunately, all of the above (as well as international efforts) will be for naught if 
simple information regarding infectious diseases fails to be effectively communicated to 
the populace.  In this regard, the governments of the developing world have failed and 
this failure is no more apparent than in South Africa, which until 2002 denied that HIV 
caused AIDS.138  More recently, former South African Deputy President Jacob Zuma, in 
his trial for allegedly raping an AIDS activist, admitted to having unprotected sex with 
the woman despite knowing that she was infected with HIV. 139  Moreover, Zuma – who 
                                                                                                                                                 
facility inspections). In addition, the prequalification of producers should be further explored (with a 
removal process) by the standard-setting bodies and the WHO. The manufacture and sale of substandard 
and counterfeit medicines is also a large problem in the developing world. Some countries facilitate this 
problem by having weak governmental regulatory agencies handle procurement and importation schemes. 
Substandard medicines are sometimes the result of unintentional error. At other times, it is intentional, 
misleading conduct which produces the inadequate drugs (this is particularly the case in India, where 
Schedule Y of India’s Drug and Cosmetics Act does not even require toxicity or bioequivalence data for 
drugs being exported). Substandard medicines are a major problem, as they lead to resistance and deaths. 
Inspection and both civil and criminal penalties are needed to reduce the proliferation of inadequate 
medicines. In addition, procurement, customs, and regulatory agencies must be provided with adequate 
resources to enforce laws, and the judicial system needs to be equipped to handle such cases. 
 133 For instance, several initiatives have been formed involving developing country research 
centers/universities, universities in developed countries and pharmaceutical companies (such as one 
initiative involving the Kenya Medical Research Institutes collaboration with GlaxoSmithKline and the 
University of Liverpool for an anti-malaria treatment). See Prescription for Healthy Development: 
Increasing Access to Medicines, supra  note 1, at 11. 
 134 See MSF 2004, supra  note 1. 
 135 See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, Defensive Drug Industry Fuels Fight Over Patents, N.Y. TIMES, April 20, 
2001, at A6; Mark Drajem, Brazil Pushes Merck, Pfizer to Cut Drug Costs Amid WTO Talks, 
BLOOMBERG, Aug. 28, 2003, 
http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000103&sid=a_804W5JtnZc&refer=us; Paulo Prado, Brazil 
Again Seeks to Cut Cost of AIDS Drug, N.Y. TIMES, April 20, 2001, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/19/business/19abbott.html?ex=1165035600&en=07473c1d770ae211&ei
=5070. For similar reports and newspaper articles, see http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/brazil/ .   See also  
Paul Vandoren & Jean Charles Van Eeckhaute, The WTO Decision on Paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health , 6 J. OF WORLD INTELL. PROP . 779, 793 (2003). 
 136 Both South Africa and Kenya have likewise received voluntary licenses for the same reason. UN 
MILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra note 1, at 62. 
 137 This strategy does have its limitations, as the voluntary license provides the drugs at a lower cost than 
previously obtainable, but does not involve any technology transfer or facilitate the development of a 
technologically improved domestic industry. Id.  
 138 AIDS Ignorance, USA TODAY, May 11, 2006, at 17A, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2006-05-10-aids-edit_x.htm [hereinafter AIDS 
Ignorance].  
 139 Manoah Esipisu & Rebecca Harrison, South Africa's Zuma Acquitted of Rape, THE BOSTON GLOBE, 
May 8, 2006, 
http://www.boston.com/news/world/africa/articles/2006/05/08/safrica_set_for_verdict_in_zuma_rape_trial/
?rss_id=Boston.com+%2F+News. 
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once headed South Africa’s anti-AIDS campaign – testified that he “took a shower” after 
the sexual encounter to diminish the risk of infection. 140  Furthermore, South Africa 
continues to promote lemons, beetroot, garlic and other traditional medicine as 
HIV/AIDS preventative medicine while at the same time publicly criticizing the side 
effects of ARV drugs.141  Such practices recently drew the ire of the international 
community at several AIDS conferences, where its policies and drug delivery record 
were chastised and for embracing theories worthy of the “lunatic fringe.”142  With such 
ignorance shown by the leaders of South Africa, it is questionable whether any 
coordinated effort will be effective until domestic knowledge is substantially improved. 
C. Innovative financing solutions for new medicines 
¶50 In addition to patent protection, the pharmaceutical industry has also often been a 
scapegoat for the lack of access to life-saving drugs in the developing world, with many 
asserting that the industry should devote more resources to illnesses and diseases 
affecting developing countries.143  This criticism is overly simplistic and does not 
accurately reflect the situation.  For instance, 77% of the WHO Essential Drugs List 
between 1977 and 2002 originated or were substantially developed by the pharmaceutical 
industry. 144  In addition, as noted above, pharmaceutical companies routinely sell 
pharmaceuticals at heavily reduced prices to developing countries in order to promote 
goodwill and, in all probability, to counter the negative publicity the industry has 
received in recent years.  However, even the most ardent critic should realize that it is 
unrealistic to ask the industry to incur losses ad infinitum. But the situation of donations 
and voluntary reductions of pricing is different than one which requires the industry to 
discount or donate its product or to forgo its patent rights in that such a mandate results in 
a de facto discriminatory tax on the industry; such a de facto tax would place the 
pharmaceutical industry at a significant disadvantage in its ability to compete for capital 
and other resources with other industries.145  Much like every other industry, one can only 
expect the pharmaceutical companies to continue researching and developing new drugs 
to combat health problems associated with the developing world when it can expect a 
reasonable return on its investment. 
                                                 
 140 AIDS Ignorance, supra note 138. 
 141 See, e.g., Beetroot But No Blushes, ECONOMIST , Aug. 24, 2006, at 40. South Africa’s health minister, 
Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, recently stated: “Raw garlic and a skin of the lemon--not only do they give 
you a beautiful face and skin but they also protect you from [HIV/ AIDS].” Sarah Boseley, Aids Groups 
Condemn South Africa's “Dr Garlic,” THE GUARDIAN (London), May 6, 2005, at 16. 
 142 Id. 
 143 While respectable NGOs such as MSF acknowledge other factors relating to a lack of research and 
development for certain diseases, they still highlight the pharmaceutical industries’ spending patterns. See 
e.g., MSF, R & D SYSTEM IS FAILING TO MEET HEALTH NEEDS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: MSF BRIEFING 
NOTE FOR MINISTERIAL SUMMIT ON HEALTH RESEARCH, MEXICO CITY, 16-20 NOVEMBER, 2004 (2005), 
available at  http://www.accessmed-
msf.org/prod/publications.asp?scntid=121120041119152&contenttype=PARA&. 
 144 UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra note 1, at 137 (industry dissent). 
 145 See Mercurio, supra  note 16, at 248-253; see also  WIPO No. 491(E), supra  note 63, at 1: (“A robust 
patent system providing for adequate patent protection is an indispensable incentive to creative and 
inventive work and is crucial to establishing and maintaining an attractive commercial environment.”); 
DFID, supra note 56, at 5-6. 
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¶51 On the other hand, it is well known that research and development of medicines and 
vaccines to address health problems of developing countries is inadequate.  The main 
problem with the current system is that patents do not provide sufficient research 
incentives where the market for the product is insufficient.  In such a circumstance, even 
though the pharmaceutical industry appears to be genuinely making an attempt to develop 
vaccinations and drugs to treat several developing country diseases,146 the fact of the 
matter remains that these vaccines and drugs are either non-existent or no longer effective 
due to resistance.147  Quite obviously, the lack of innovation in this area is at least partly 
responsible for prolonging the public health crises in the developing world.148  Again, the 
current incentive structure promoting research and development of medicines and 
vaccines to address health problems of developing countries is deficient.149 
¶52 In order to ensure sustained research and development into the afflictions of the 
developing world and widespread access to the resulting drugs, health priorities must be 
re-oriented and incentives provided for the industry or pharmaceutical companies will 
eventually exit the market, thus reducing the number of new drugs to service the 
developing world.150  Despite much publicized rhetoric, simply expropriating the 
intellectual property rights of pharmaceutical companies is not the long-term solution.  
This point is illustrated by using an analogy to the expropriation of a foreign-owned 
manufacturing plant or a foreign-owned bank account.  Such expropriation would 
inevitably result in less foreign investment in the country.  Likewise, the expropriation of 
a company’s intellectual property results in less research and development into medicines 
to prevent and treat diseases afflicting the expropriating country. 
                                                 
 146 See UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra  note 1, at 139 (industry dissent). The pharmaceutical 
industry states: “[We] continue to play an important role in development of medicines for malaria, TB, and 
other diseases occurring primarily in developing countries. For example, Novartis recently established a 
research centre in Singapore for the discovery and development of drugs for tropical diseases, with and 
initial focus on TB and dengue fever. When drugs are finally produced, they will be sold at no profit. Astra 
Zeneca has created a new discovery research facility in Bangalore, India, which will focus exclusively on 
TB. GlaxoSmithKline has a dedicated facility in Tres Cantos, Spain, for drug discovery in diseases of the 
developing world, including malaria and TB. They currently have two antimalarial drugs in development 
(phases I and III) as well as vaccines in clinical trials for TB and malaria. Much of this work is in 
association with public-private partnerships that offer a new and innovative approach to drug and vaccine 
development—a development barely cited in the report.”  
 147 For more information, see the WHO webpage on drug resistance. WHO, Drug Resistance, 
http://www.who.int/drugresistance/en/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2006); see also , Carol C. Adelman et al., 
Myths and Realities, supra note 112, 13-16. 
 148 See, e.g., MSF, ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES CAMPAIGN AND THE DRUG FOR NEGLECTED 
DISEASES WORKING GROUP, FATAL IMBALANCE: THE CRISIS IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FOR DRUGS 
FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES (2001), available at www.msf.org/source/access/2001/fatal/fatalshort.pdf . For 
more on the cost of combating the AIDS crisis, see UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT , REPORT OF THE TASK 
FORCE ON HIV/AIDS, MALARIA, TB, AND ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES, WORKING GROUP ON 
HIV/AIDS: COMBATING AIDS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD, 129-49 (2005), available at 
http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/HIVAIDS-complete.pdf.  
 149 See GLOBAL FORUM FOR HEALTH RESEARCH, THE 10/90 REPORT ON HEALTH RESEARCH: 2003-2004 
(2004), available at 
http://www.globalforumhealth.org/Site/002__What%20we%20do/005__Publications/001__10%2090%20r
eports.php (PDF form of THE 10/90 REPORT ON HEALTH RESEARCH: 2003-2004 is available on the right 
side of the webpage by chapter) (reporting that approximately 90% of the research and development of 
health research goes to diseases afflicting mainly the developed world); Condon & Sinha, supra  note 13. 
 150 See Mercurio, supra  note 16, at 251; see also  ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT  (OECD), PATENTS AND INNOVATION: TRENDS AND POLICY CHALLENGE 9 (2004), available 
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/12/24508541.pdf [hereinafter OECD 2004] (stating “[e]mpirical 
evidence tends to support the effectiveness of patents in encouraging innovation”). 
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¶53 It is also too simplistic to demand that the pharmaceutical company expend more 
resources on researching and developing drugs relating to developing country diseases.  
The pharmaceutical industry is like very few in the world where research and 
development and trials account for 30% of total production costs and where a rigorous 
regulatory process is necessary before the products can be marketed and sold.151  This 
procedure guarantees the safety and effectiveness of the drugs, but in the process renders 
much of the research and development expenditure by the industry essentially wasted as 
the vast majority of drugs fail to reach the market.  In fact, only 5 of every 250 
compounds that enter preclinical testing make it to clinical trials, with over half failing 
the clinical trial stage and an additional large number failing the regulatory stage.152  For 
those drugs proven to be safe and effective, the process of navigating through the trials 
and regulatory stage takes years and millions of dollars, and all this takes place while the 
period of exclusivity granted by the patent is dwindling.153  Pharmaceutical companies 
can only ever hope to generate modest profits in the developing world, but it may be that 
modest profit is vital to ensure that research and development continues for certain 
diseases.154  Therefore, a period of restricted competition is required for the recoupment 
of research and development and regulatory costs, as well as for the making of small 
profits in order to encourage future creation and ensure that some suppliers do not exit 
the market entirely.155  However, where a market is incapable of paying for the treatment, 
patents do not provide the necessary impetus to encourage research and development.  In 
such a circumstance, incentives must be provided to the pharmaceutical industry or 
directly funded by governments, international organizations or from other sources. 
¶54 In this regard, the problem with access to medicines in the developing world is two-
fold: (1) developing countries either cannot afford to purchase existing drugs or do not 
have the infrastructure to safely store, transport and administer the drugs; and (2) there 
are no existing drugs to prevent or treat diseases mainly afflicting the developing world. 
                                                 
 151 See Moran, supra  note 100, at 25. The industry estimates that it spends approximately 17% or more 
of sales on research and development, a figure three times more than the next highest-spending industry 
(telecommunications), and four times more than the defence industry and all other industries. See PHRMA, 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY PROFILE 2003 (2003), available at http://www.phrma-
jp.org/publication/pdf/industry/2003/2003FRONT.pdf. 
 152 PHRMA, PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY PROFILE 2006, 2, 5-6 (2006), available at 
http://www.phrma.org/files/2006%20Industry%20Profile.pdf. 
 153 The pharmaceutical industry reports the average effective life of a patent as being 11.5 years. Id. at 8. 
 154 The OECD referred to patents as an “essential factor” in the development of new medicines. More 
specifically, an OECD report stated that patents were important to start-ups and university spin-offs in the 
biomedical field for the protection and raising of capital. The report did warn, however, that patent 
protection could lead to overly strong regulatory positions. See OECD 2004, supra note 150; see also John 
P. Walsh et al., Science and the Law: Working Through the Patent Problem, 299 SCI. 1021 (2003) (finding 
that although IPRs create complexities, they are a necessary stimulus, have never caused research to halt 
midstream and can be effectively managed). 
155 See Alan O. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha “Solution”, 3 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 47, 57 (2002). A survey of “executives in a range of industries were asked to estimate what 
percentage of inventions . . . in the early-1980s would not have been developed without [adequate] patent 
protection.” Id. The survey revealed that 14% of all products would not have been invented, but that 60% 
of pharmaceutical products would not have been developed without patent protection. Id. at 60-61 (citation 
omitted). See also  Roy Widdus, Product Development Partnerships on “Neglected Diseases”: How They 
Handle Intellectual Property and How This May Contribute to Improving Access to Pharmaceuticals for 
HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria, ICTSD-INCTAD DIALOGUE ON ENSURING POLICY OPTIONS FOR AFFORDABLE 
ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES (2004), available at 
http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/bellagio/docs/Widdus_Bellagio3_revised.pdf. 
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¶55 An example of developing countries not being able to afford existing treatment 
options can be seen from the recent advances of ARV drugs in the treatment of 
HIV/AIDS.  Thus, while there is still no cure for the disease, it has been effectively 
controlled in the developed world largely due to the availability of modern ARV drugs.156  
Studies have shown that the mortality rate in the United States has declined by over 75% 
over three years through the use of ARV drug cocktails.157  Patients in developing 
countries, however, can neither afford the wide range of drugs available on the developed 
country market, nor do they have the facilities or the means to effectively administer the 
few drugs that they do have access to.  For these reasons, the epidemic remains 
uncontrolled in the developing world and sub-Saharan Africa alone must contend with 
over 25 million people infected with HIV/AIDS (which account for more than 70% of all 
HIV/AIDS cases globally).158 
¶56 In this regard, while the efforts of the pharmaceutical industry159 and aid agencies in 
either reducing the price,160 donating drugs or facilitating delivery to developing 
countries,161 are beneficial, ad hoc arrangements are not sufficient.162  Instead, scale 
coordinated, targeted aid and large scale equity pricing schemes must be implemented in 
order to guarantee the long-term supply of affordable, quality drugs to the developing 
world.163  Under equity pricing, countries and regions would only pay what they can 
afford while continuing to make use of voluntary and compulsory licences, negotiating 
and transparency in order to ensure the procurement of low cost drugs.164  In essence, 
                                                 
 156 IIPI, supra  note 76, at 9. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. at 4. 
 159 Credit must be given to the pharmaceutical industry for their efforts at promoting global healthcare. 
For instance, the industry spends between $1.4-2.1 billion dollars annually for global healthcare – a figure 
that represents more than a third of the United States’ total healthcare assistance to the developing world. 
See PHRMA, GLOBAL PARTNERSHIPS: HUMANITARIAN PROGRAMS OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IN 
DEVELOPING NATIONS 1 (2004), available at http://www.phrma.org/files/Global_Partnerships_2004.pdf 
[hereinafter PHRMA 2004]. In addition, in 2003, industry members of the Partnership for Quality Medical 
Donation provided more than $1.4 billion in donated drugs, and in 2002, pharmaceutical companies’ select 
humanitarian programs totalled $810 million. See PHRMA, IMPROVING HEALTH IN THE DEVELOPING 
WORLD (2004) (on file with author). More specific donation programs can be seen throughout PHRMA 
2004. Id. Overall, the industry provides almost the same, if not more, total aid than most governments and 
international health organizations. UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra  note 1, app. 2, at 138. 
 160 At least one commentator believes that the reduction in price is, for the most part, not low enough to 
be efficiently utilized. See Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation 
in International Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 193, 225-27 (2005). For 
statistics on the health budget of some developing countries, see supra  text accompanying notes 99 and 
100. 
 161 For instance, UNICEF and the Rockefeller Foundation secure lower prices for drugs and vaccines 
due to their procurement practices, warehousing and delivery networks. UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, 
supra  note 1, at 78. In fact, UNICEF claims it supplies 40% of the vaccine market for AIDS covering 5% 
of market in financial terms. Id. The Stop TB Partnership and Global TB Drug Facility supply the vaccine 
market at similar rates for those afflictions. Id. 
 162 Several studies have shown that small scale donations are, for the most part, not appropriate or 
unsustainable for meeting local needs. See, e.g.,  Phillippe Autier et al., Drug Donations in Post-emergency 
Situations, in WORLD BANK HEALTH, NUTRITION & POPULATION FAMILY (HNP) DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 
(2002), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/HEALTHNUTRITIONANDPOPULATION/Resources/281627-
1095698140167/Nassery-DrugDonation-whole.pdf. 
 163 The WHO successfully initiated equity pricing in the 1980s for vaccines and reproductive health. UN 
MILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra  note 1, at 68.  
 164  See, e.g., WHO Secretariat, More Equitable Pricing for Essential Drugs: What do we Mean and 
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equity pricing would allow developing countries to procure drugs without having to pay 
for development costs, marketing or shareholder returns.  More specifically, sales to 
lower- income developing countrie s would be at a “no profit, no loss.”165  Middle- income 
countries would pay a higher rate for the drugs while the burden on developed countries 
would be even greater in order to cover the development costs, marketing and 
shareholder returns.166 
¶57 The second, and perhaps more difficult, problem is that a number of diseases 
primarily affecting the developing world, i.e., African trypanosomiasis, Chagas disease, 
leishmaniasis, and dengue fever, have been neglected by the pharmaceutical industry and 
there is either no cure, vaccine or treatment or new medicines available to “address [the] 
shortcomings of existing treatments, such as safety, efficacy, appropriate dosing, length 
of treatment, and the ongo ing threat of drug resistance.”167  While the international 
community (most notably, philanthropic foundations, certain governments and the 
pharmaceutical industry) has improved its response and has provided needed resources to 
fund research and development for new medicines, more financial resources are needed 
on an ongoing basis to “create a strong and sustainable pipeline of new products”.168  In 
this regard, “[n]ew thinking, different means of financing and organizing medicines 
development, and other reforms are needed.  For example, the WHO Commission on 
Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation, and Public Health should examine alternative 
international models to the current patent-based system for priority setting and financing 
of health R&D.”169 
¶58 In the current climate, for-profit pharmaceutical companies will not reorientate 
research priorities.  Therefore, incentives in the form of subsidies and other support need 
to be given to all those involved in the research and development of essential medicines, 
including pharmaceutical manufacturers, academia, government researchers and national 
organisations.  Industrialized countries must bear the cost of these subsidies.170  In 
addition, alternative intellectual property strategies, such as placing medical innovations 
in the public domain, sharing bundles on IPRs, patent pools, patent clearinghouses, public 
                                                                                                                                                 
What are the Issues?, in WHO-WTO SECRETARIAT WORKSHOP ON DIFFERENTIAL PRICING AND FINANCING 
OF ESSENTIAL DRUGS, NORWAY, APR. 8-11, 2001 (2001), available at  
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/who_background_e.doc.   
 165 See UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra note 1, at 18, 68, 115. 
 166 The extraction of profits from developing countries have been called “both cruel and unnecessary: 
cruel because people will die because a life-saving treatment is possible, but unaffordable; unnecessary 
because low-income populations would never have contributed much towards global R&D cost recovery in 
any case.” Kevin Outterson, Nonrival Access to Pharmaceutical Knowledge (2005), available at 
http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/submissions/KevinOutterson3january.pdf. 
167 UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra  note 1, at 31. MSF states that while over 1200 new chemical 
entities have been registered in the world over the past 20 years, only 13 were for tropical diseases. MARIE 
BYSTRÖM & PETER EINARSSON, TRIPS: CONSEQUENCES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
SWEDISH DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION, CONSULTANCY REPORT TO THE SWEDISH INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AGENCY 37 (2001), available at http://ww.grain.org/docs/sida-trips-2001-
en.pdf. For similar statistics, see Gavin Yamey, Public Sector Must Develop Drugs for Neglected Diseases, 
324 BRIT . MED. J. 698 (2002); Troullier et al., supra  note 91; Ellen’t Hoen, Statement by MSF at WIPO 
General Assembly (Sept. 30, 2004), http://www.cptech.org/ip/wipo/msf09302004.html (last visited July 18, 
2006). 
 168 UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra note 1, at 31. 
 169 Id.; see also  PRIMO BRAGA & CARLOS CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS (2000).  
 170 Several studies conclude that current levels of donor assistance are inadequate and must be 
substantially raised. See, e.g., WHO CMH 2001, supra  note 91; Troullier et al., supra note 91. 
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databases and non-rival access to knowledge must be further studied and implemented.171  
Moreover, complete alternatives to the current scheme must be further studied to provide 
the needed incentives to increase research and development of neglected diseases.  Such 
efforts include compulsory licensing or patent buy-outs,172 employer-based payroll 
taxes,173 patent auctions 174 and well- funded research centers.175 
¶59 Currently, the development of public and private partnerships (PPPs) is one of the 
most encouraging developments in the area.176  PPPs are an innovative way to finance 
creative solutions and encourage innovation. 177  More specifically, successful PPPs: 
• deliver critical funding; 
• draw attention to health threats that may not be widely known; 
• share knowledge and resources; 
• build the numbers needed to facilitate volume-related discounts; and 
• achieve specific public health disease management objectives.178 
¶60 In addition, it is widely believed that the probability of the success of PPPs is 
enhanced when: 
• common performance measures are developed; 
• clinical trial capacity development is coordinated;  
• the potential of disease endemic countries is harnessed; 
• the financial stability of the PPPs is ensured;  
• the research, development and access components are communicated and 
                                                 
 171 OECD 2004, supra  note 150, at 23; DFID 2004, supra  note 4; Outterson, supra  note 166. Moreover, 
the OECD has embraced economic-based reforms of patent regimes including “introducing a more 
differentiated approach to patent protection that depends on specific characteristics of the inventions, such 
as their life cycle or their value (as opposed to the current uniform system); making patent fees 
commensurate to the degree of protection provided; and, developing alternatives to patenting such as the 
public domain.” OECD 2004, supra  note 150, at 6. For more analysis and alternatives, see John Barton, 
Integrating IPR Policies in Development Strategies, in TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT 
PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND SUSTAINABILITY 5-64 (Christophe Bellmann et al. eds., 2003); 
Carlos Correa, Formulating Effective Pro-development National Intellectual Property Policies, in TRADING 
IN KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND SUSTAINABILITY 209-18 (Christophe 
Bellmann et al. eds., 2003); see also UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra  note 1, at 59-60; WHO, 
PUBLIC HEALTH, INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH 161-92 (2006), available at 
http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/documents/thereport/CIPIHReport23032006.pdf. It must be 
recalled that alternatives are not likely to have much impact on the pharmaceutical industry (for instance, 
Africa as a whole comprises only 1% of the world pharmaceuticals market). Moran, supra  note 100, at 26. 
 172 See, e.g., Mattias Ganslandt et al.,  Developing and Distributing Essential Medicines to Poor 
Countries: The DEFEND Proposal, 24 WORLD ECON. 779 (2001). 
 173 See, e.g., Tim Hubbard & James Love, A New Trade Framework for Global Healthcare R & D, 2(2) 
PLOS BIOLOGY e52 (2004), http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=340954 (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2007); Thomas W. Pogge, Human Rights and Global Health: A Research Program, 36 
METAPHILOSOPHY 182, 182-209 (2005). 
 174 See, e.g., Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation, 113 Q. J. 
ECON. 1137 (1998). 
 175 See, e.g ., The Free Market Drug Act of 2004, H.R. 5155, 108th Cong. (2004). For more information, 
see Congressman Kucinich’s website, Congressman Dennis J. Kucinich, 
http://kucinich.house.gov/news/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=28571 (last visited Jan. 3, 2007). 
 176 See, for example, the research by the Medicines for Malaria Venture, THE NEW LANDSCAPE OF 
NEGLECTED DISEASE DRUG DEVELOPMENT (2005), available at http://mmv.org/IMG/pdf/Chapter_2.pdf. 
 177 For basic information and stimulating questions, see WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM AND THE UNITED 
NATIONS FOUNDATION, PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: MEETING IN THE MIDDLE (2003), available at 
http://www.weforum.org/pdf/Initiatives/GHI_2003_Meeting_in_the_middle.pdf. 
 178 UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra  note 1, at 54-55. 
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coordinated; and 
• industry contributions are fully recruited and involved.179 
¶61 While it is beyond the scope of this article to develop a model for increasing 
research and development into these diseases, several useful models already exist and all 
stress the need for cooperation between public, private, academic, philanthropic 
foundations, government and international organisations.180  All of these models stress 
that increased financing, clear priorities, effective management and meaningful 
technology and knowledge transfers are all necessary components to the equation. 181 
¶62 Importantly, PPPs provide a viable solution to improving the public health crises 
without the need to tackle the reform of intellectual property systems.  Moreover, PPPs 
address both the underlying problems of affordability and development by providing an 
alternative to dependence on donations from governments and other organisations or 
access to essential medicines from pharmaceutical companies.182  Under the PPP model, 
private companies provide technology as well as development and distribution expertise, 
while the public sector partners fund development costs and help ensure the medicines 
reach those who are most in need.183  There is thus no set formula for PPPs and different 
groups tend to focus on different (or multiple) access and development aspects; for 
instance, some promote leadership and capacity building, others focus on educating the 
public on intellectual property laws and promoting access to medicines and still others 
focus on increasing regulatory bodies in the developing world to ensure safe and quality 
medicines and increased registration. 184 
¶63 By far, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is one of if not the largest donors to 
PPPs, supporting, among others, the Global Fund, WHO efforts and US agencies 
providing access to medicines.185  Significantly, the Gates Foundation provides grants and 
rewards for discovery of new medicines to prevent, alleviate or treat developing county 
illnesses and diseases.186  The Gates Foundation also excels in the promotion of research 
and development (such as clinical trials) currently lacking existing vaccines or 
medicines.187 
¶64 By working together, the public and private sector, aid organisations and 
governments have demonstrated the ability to positively influence the course of the 
developing world.  One example of a potential PPP success is the partnership initiative 
between the pharmaceutical company GlaxoSmithKlein, the University of Liverpool and 
                                                 
 179 See ROY WIDDUS & KATHERINE WHITE, COMBATING DISEASES A SSOCIATED WITH POVERTY: 
FINANCING STRATEGIES FOR PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT AND THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS 23 (Abr. ver. 2004), available at 
http://www.globalforumhealth.org/filesupld/ippph/CombatingDiseases.pdf. 
 180 See, e.g., id. For some of the pharmaceutical industries’ contributions to these efforts, see UN 
MILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra  note 1, at 138-39 (industry dissent). 
 181 Id. 
 182 For a more complete definition and illustration of PPPs, see PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR 
PUBLIC HEALTH  1-18 (Michael R. Reich ed., 2002). 
 183 For more detail, see Adetokunbo O. Lucas, Public-Private Partnerships: Illustrative Examples, in 
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH  1-18 (Michael R. Reich ed., 2002). 
 184 See e.g., Widdus & White, supra  note 89, at 5. 
 185 See id. at 4-5; UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra  note 1, at 46, 54-55, 60, 138.  
 186 Interestingly, the first grant provided under this scheme was to a non-profit pharmaceutical company. 
For more information, see Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, http://www.gatesfoundation.org/default.htm 
(last visited Jan. 3, 2007).  
 187 Id. 
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the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, and a £2.5 million grant from the 
UK Government’s Department of International Development to research and launch the 
malaria-treatment drug Lapdap.188  This initiative highlights two important points, namely 
that public funding can be used on a range of public policy initiatives to control and 
relieve the overall health crisis, and second, that resources and attention do not need to be 
predominantly placed on amending the current IP regulation which allow for viable 
solutions to the lack of access to medicine problem. 189 
¶65 Both the quantity of PPPs and funding to PPPs is increasing, but the majority of 
initiatives – including the Global Fund and WHO efforts – remain under-funded.190  This 
is especially the case for the traditionally neglected diseases such as African 
trypanosomiasis, Chagas and leishmaniasis.191  While funding for these diseases is 
improving,192 a critical shortage remains.  However, it cannot be stressed enough that in 
order to be effective, aid programs must be coordinated and address issues surrounding 
the governance, participation, procurement, prioritization and best practices of PPPs.193  
Sporadic, ad hoc, diffuse or uncoordinated aid or PPPs will not help alleviate the 
suffering. 
D. Differential pricing and the prevention of trade diversion  
¶66 Parallel importation occurs when the patent holder sells a product to a buyer who 
exports the product to a second buyer in another country. 194  Parallel importing of 
products is an attractive option when the price of the imported product, taking into 
account transportation and tariffs, is lower than the price of the same product legally 
made or imported into the country.  Parallel importation undercuts the ability of a patent 
holder to engage in price discrimination, i.e., tiered pricing, across national borders and 
can severely reduce profit levels of international companies.  Importantly, the Doha 
Declaration confirmed the existing right available under TRIPS that each WTO Member 
may establish its own regime of exhaustion of intellectual property rights.195  Parallel 
importing is therefore not in and of itself a violation of TRIPS and many countries (both 
                                                 
 188 See Press Release, WHO, Glaxosmithkline and World Health Organization Sign Agreement to 
Develop a New Treatment For Malaria (Mar. 2, 2001), available at http://www.who.int/inf-pr-
2001/en/pr2001-10.html. The initiative was established following the DFID’s release of its report on 
intellectual property rights. See THE DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, UK GOVERNMENT 
RESPONSE TO THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: “INTEGRATING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY” 5-6 (2003), available at 
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/govt_response/govt_response.pdf. 
 189 See Press Release, WHO, supra note 188. 
 190 UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra note 1, at 148. 
 191 Id. at 59. 
 192 For instance, the pharmaceutical company Roche donated technology to the Brazilian government to 
manufacture effective medicines. Id. 
 193 See, e.g., UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra  note 1, at 46, 107-08. For issues of governance, see 
Kate Buse, Governing Public-Private Infectious Disease Partnerships, 10 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 225 
(2004) (highlighting “design” faults and lack of developing country participation in many PPPs); see also  
THE BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUNDATION, DEVELOPING SUCCESSFUL GLOBAL HEALTH ALLIANCES 
(2002), available at http://www.gatesfoundation.org/nr/downloads/globalhealth/GlobalHealthAlliances.pdf. 
 194 For more information, see Consumer Project on Technology, Health Care and Intellectual Property: 
Parallel Imports , http://www.cptech.org/ip/fsd/health-pi.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2007). 
 195 See Doha Declaration, supra note 22, at para. 5(d). 
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developed and developing) take advantage of this flexibility to import products such as 
books and CDs.196 
¶67 The problem for the parallel importation of pharmaceuticals and related products is 
that they are being distributed to developing countries at reduced prices or donated, 
which also allows companies to charge a high price in developed countries able and 
willing to meet the higher price.197  This enables the companies to recoup the costs of 
offering a lower price to those markets unable or unwilling to meet that same price, but 
there is nothing to prevent the importing nation from exporting the drugs back to the 
original market or any other market for profit.  Of course, such conduct on the part of 
developing countries would be against the spirit of the Doha Declaration and prevent the 
goal of facilitating access to medicines from being reached.198  Paragraph 4 of the 
Implementation Agreement attempts to resolve the uncertainty, but it is a compromise 
provision fraught with uncertainty. 199  Paragraph 4 attempts to balance the concerns of 
both developed and developing countries by instructing importing countries to take 
measures to prevent re-exportation, but leaves unclear the issue of to what extent an 
importing country must act.200  Instead, Paragraph 4 merely states that the measures must 
be “reasonable,” “within their means,” and “proportionate to their administrative 
capacities and to the risk of trade diversion.”201 
¶68 In order to maintain price discrimination between developed countries that can 
afford the medicines and developing countries that need the medicines, the supply of 
pharmaceuticals at reduced prices must be conditioned on the fact that the drugs will be 
used to ease their health crisis, not simply re-exported to a market willing to pay a higher 
price for the drugs.  While the Implementation Agreement is designed to avoid imposing 
conditions that developing countries cannot meet while also encouraging them to take 
responsibility to ensure that medicines reach their intended destinations, the ambiguity of 
their responsibilities and the lack of repercussions following a breach could potentially 
unsettle the system.  Whether the risk is real or imagined, it is clear that the 
pharmaceutical industry is concerned about the implications of pharmaceutical 
arbitrage/diversion from low income markets to high income markets.202  This fear, in 
turn, impacts upon the willingness of the industry to donate or sell drugs at a reduced 
price to the developing world.203 
                                                 
 196 In fact, the parties effectively did not reach agreement on the issue. In the end, the decision to allow 
its operation resulted because the parties could not agree on how to govern its use or otherwise restrict its 
use. See Peggy B. Sherman & Ellwood F. Oakley, III, Pandemics and Panaceas: The World Trade 
Organization's Efforts to Balance Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to AIDS Drugs, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 
353 (2004). 
 197 For examples of pharmaceutical companies voluntarily licensing products to companies in 
developing countries, see Adelman et al., Myths and Realities, supra note 112, at 5-6. 
 198 See Implementation Agreement, supra note 45. 
 199 For criticism, see Mercurio, supra  note 16, at 244-45. 
 200 Id. 
 201 See Implementation Agreement, supra  note 45, at para. 4. 
 202 Matthews, supra  note 54, at 100. 
 203 One commentator claims that, “Empirically, such arbitrage is rarely observed, and need not be a 
significant threat…”  Outterson, supra  note 160, at 257-60; but see HIV Drugs for Africa Diverted to 
Europe, Wash. Post, Oct. 3, 2002, at A10 (detailing how only ten percent of over $18 million dollars worth 
of HIV/AIDS medication (sold to Africa at a discount of up to 90% ) sent from GlaxoSmithKline in Europe 
reached its intended destination due to a sophisticated regime of diverting, relabelling and re-shipping the 
medication back to Europe). 
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¶69 In addition, while Paragraph 4 envisions developed countries assisting those 
developing countries and LDCs that “experience[] difficulty” in preventing diversion, its 
conditions and guidance are inadequate, only allowing developed countries to provide 
technical and financial cooperation to prevent diversion “on request and on mutually 
agreed terms and conditions” of the importing Member.204  Therefore, if an importing 
Member does nothing to prevent or encourages or even brokers a deal for the diversion of 
medicines away from its citizens and into another market, other Members and/or the 
patent holder cannot prevent the diversion (other than through their domestic 
institutions).  Such a system invites abuse and provides no stop mechanism.  It would 
seem appropriate for Members to have the ability to become involved in an effort to 
prevent diversion, particularly if the importing Member is actively participating in such 
diversion.  At the very least, one would expect that the Implementation Agreement would 
include a provision allowing aggrieved Members the right to complain to and refer the 
matter to the Council for TRIPS.  But the Implementation Agreement does not provide 
for redress of diversion, instead viewing the measure’s only purpose to ensure medicines 
reach their destination, and fails to provide property holders with any mechanism to 
enforce their rights.205 
¶70 In not taking a stronger stand in the Implementation Agreement, WTO Members 
missed an opportunity to effectively monitor the sale of pharmaceuticals to developing 
countries (whether by compulsory or voluntary licensing or through price 
discrimination).206  For instance, the Council for TRIPS could monitor transactions and 
better ensure not only that the drugs do not get re-exported but also that only minimal 
economic, legal, and bureaucratic burdens are placed on the importing country.  Such a 
system, if properly designed, could have been workable and agreeable to all concerned 
parties.207  On the other hand, while preventing re- importation is the goal, any potential 
solution cannot unduly raise developing country compliance costs.208  In this regard, the 
implementation concerns of developing countries are well- founded. 
                                                 
 204 See Implementation Agreement, supra  note 45, at para. 4. 
 205 See generally id. 
 206 This may have the effect of limiting or reducing donations/furthering price discrimination in 
developing country markets. See, e.g., Keith E. Maskus, Parallel Imports In Pharmaceuticals: Implications 
For Competition And Prices In Developing Countries (2001), http://www.wipo.int/about-
ip/en/studies/pdf/ssa_maskus_pi.pdf. 
 207 In such a circumstance, the US and other nations have sought to impose strict standards on other 
nations via FTAs providing for the restriction and/or prohibition on parallel importation. This development 
is regrettable, as it fragments trade and prevents large scale price discrimination and donation. For example, 
US FTAs with Morocco (art. 15.9.4) and Australia (art. 17.9.4) prohibit parallel importation; however, both 
agreements provide that the prohibition may be limited to cases where the patent owner has placed 
restrictions by contract or other means. Notwithstanding this footnote, the provision may effectively 
prohibit parallel importation and essentially allow patent holders, through contract law, to segment markets 
and maintain price discrimination. Furthermore, the US-Singapore FTA (art. 16.7.2) also restricts parallel 
importation by allowing patent holders to block parallel importation into either country when the same is 
done in violation of a distribution agreement anywhere in the world. Interestingly, a numb er of US FTAs 
with developing countries, including Chile, Jordan and CAFTA, are silent on the exhaustion of patent 
rights; thus, these countries have retained the flexibility granted by TRIPS. On the other hand, the draft text 
of the Free Trade of the Americas (FTAA) only partially allows for the retention of the TRIPS flexibility, 
allowing each country to determine its own rules on parallel importation but then obliging them to set up 
regional exhaustion under their domestic laws within five years. In effect, this would allow parallel 
importation within the FTAA zone, while keeping the world market segmented.  
 208 See UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra  note 1, at 67-68. 
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¶71 Therefore, while patent protection and TRIPS is not the cause of or even a 
significant factor in worsening the public health crisis in the developing world, it is not a 
perfect agreement and – if the pharmaceutical industry is to be believed – can be 
amended to facilitate increased donations of essential medicines.  Two possible solutions 
are suggested for dealing with the shortcomings of TRIPS and the accompanying 
agreements.  First, TRIPS could be amended so as to allow for redress of diversion 
through dispute settlement.  This suggestion concededly has many flaws, but a possible 
solution to halting existing and preventing further trade diversion may lie in setting up an 
effective dispute settlement scheme or allowing the existing system to hear cases where 
Members who have acquired drugs under a license or through price 
discrimination/donation based on their economic and public health needs are exporting 
the drugs for profit.  It must be acknowledged, however, that Articles 28 and 5 of TRIPS 
and Paragraph 5(d) of the Doha Declaration may perhaps impede such a solution as they 
do not permit Members from challenging schemes dealing with the exhaustion of 
intellectual property rights. 
¶72 Of course, even if TRIPS was amended to allow dispute settlement over 
diversionary issues, an additional barrier exists on the practical matter of how to monitor 
such trade diversionary practices.  One possibility would be for a body to be established 
to monitor possible trade diversions,209 but this would be a costly endeavor as 
considerable funding would be required to set up such an international watchdog.  It 
would seem more practical for that funding to be diverted into more essential areas such 
as building infrastructure and alternative solutions to the trade diversion problem. 
¶73 A more practical solution to the problem would seem to be through simple 
amendments to TRIPS.  For example, Sykes suggests that amendments to TRIPS could 
be made which permit sectoral agreements on the exhaustion issue depending on the 
product in order to discourage or prohibit parallel imports of pharmaceuticals.210  
However, it is well known that consensus decision making in the WTO significantly 
impedes progress or amendments of any kind.211  For instance, one must remember that 
Members negotiated for over two years to reach a consensus to a solution on the 
Paragraph 6 issue of the Doha Declaration and it seems unlikely that any revision of 
TRIPS will be any easier.212 
¶74 That being said, there may be potential in the future to adopt a regime which is 
similar to the system currently operating in the EU.  The EU uses its own regional 
exhaustion of rights doctrine to prohibit imports of cheaper patented drugs from outside 
the EU. 213  The EU arrangements differ from the system agreed by the WTO in the 
Implementation Agreement in that the EU scheme protects the interests of patent holding 
proprietary pharmaceutical companies by deterring trade diversion of low-cost drugs they 
                                                 
 209 The packaging and labelling requirements imposed by the Implementation Agreement will allow 
generic drugs to be easily identifiable. 
 210 Sykes, supra  note 155, at 67. 
 211 See, e.g ., Jeffrey J. Schott & Jayashree Watal, Decision-Making in the WTO, 00-2 INT’L ECON. POL’Y 
BRIEFS 2 (2000); Mary E. Footer, The Role of Consensus in GATT/WTO Decision-Making, 17 NW. J. INT’L 
L. & BUS.  653, 661 (1996-97). 
 212 The “expeditious” solution to paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on Public Health of 2001 was not 
resolved until August 30, 2003. 
 213 See Council Regulation No. 953/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 135) 5 (EC), available at http://trade-
info.cec.eu.int/antitradediversion_html/en.pdf. 
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have made available.214  Under the EU arrangements, exporting drug companies may 
apply to the Commission for permission to put their medicines onto a tiered price list, 
selling them to developing countries at a fraction of the factory price.215  Re-importation 
of these drugs is prohibited from 76 least-developed and developing countries.  In order 
to facilitate the agreement, the drugs listed carry a logo so that they are identifiable by 
customs authorities examining imports at the EU borders.216 
¶75 Practically, the EU approach is more favorable than the current multinational 
approach for several reasons.  First, it protects the patent-holding pharmaceutical 
companies directly and provides incentives, through the safeguards imposed, for these 
companies to provide discounted drugs to the developing world.217  Second, the cost of 
the EU approach may prove to be significantly less than the current administrative and 
procedural costs under the WTO scheme as the EU scheme only requires that the 
products listed carry a particular logo.218  Perhaps on the global scale, each region of the 
developed world participating in such a scheme, for example, North America, 
Australasia, etc., may have its own logo to identify that particular region.  If the EU 
scheme proves both effective at encouraging the export of discounted pharmaceuticals to 
the developing world while also preventing diversion back into the market, or into 
another market, it may provide the evidence needed to amend Article 6 of TRIPS and 
sanction a uniform and non-discretionary scheme to prevent the diversion of trade. 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶76 This article demonstrates that the TRIPS regime of patent protection does not fully 
explain why one-third of the world’s poor lack access to essential medicines.  The public 
health crises plaguing much of the developing world are a large-scale global problem, but 
it is a problem for which there is a global solution. 219  The developed world has a duty to 
the countries suffering public health problems and, in doing so, must address several 
factors, including funding, medical infrastructure, education, and intellectual property 
regulations.  Although seemingly forgotten, it is important to realize that the issue of 
global access to medicine requires measures and policies much broader than simply 
amending global intellectual property protection.  In the current situation, many of the 
developing countries experiencing public health crisis cannot even afford to buy and 
distribute pharmaceutical products that are off-patent, let alone warehouse, store and 
                                                 
 214 See id. The WTO scheme, on the other hand, is designed to deter trade diversion in circumstances 
where generic drug producers manufacture and export low-cost drugs to developing countries under 
compulsory licensing conditions. See Implementation Agreement, supra  note 45, at paras. 4 and 5. 
 215 Council Regulation No. 953/2003, supra note 213. 
 216 The logo is depicted in Annex V of the Regulation as the winged staff of Aesculapius with a coiled 
serpent in the centre of a circle formed by twelve stars. See id. at Annex V. As mentioned earlier, however, 
some argue that marking drugs exported to developing countries adds an unnecessary cost to the process. 
See id.  
 217 See generally id. 
 218 Although both the WTO and EU schemes have packaging requirements, the WTO scheme seems 
more burdensome with regard to the extent of the labelling and packaging requirements, as well as the 
procedural requirements.  
 219 See Jonathan D. Quick, Ensuring Access to Essential Medicines in the Developing Countries: A 
Framework for Action, 73(4) CLIN. PHARMACOL. THER. 279 (2003); see generally, JEFFREY D. SACHS, THE 
END OF POVERTY: ECONOMIC POSSIBILITIES FOR OUR TIME (2005). 
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administer the drugs and vaccines donated by the pharmaceutical companies.220  This is 
the reality they face and in this reality we must ask if the issuance of compulsory 
licenses, or otherwise allowing access to patented pharmaceutical products, will do any 
good. 
¶77 Numerous diseases, such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis, are at an 
epidemic level in many developing countries, and yet commercial research and 
development of essential medicines to prevent or treat these ailments (less HIV/AIDS) is 
almost non-existent.221  The reason for this is simple: it does not make good economic 
sense for any industry to pour money into a product that does not have at least a promise 
of return and the countries afflicting with these diseases do not have the ability to pay for 
any new medical and treatment options.  Thus, under the current structure, incentives to 
research into the area of diseases afflicting the developing world are almost non-existent.  
Therefore, while TRIPS allows for countries to issue a compulsory license to acquire 
needed drugs, there is sometimes no drug on the market to alleviate the problem due to 
lack of research and development.222 
¶78 Developing countries themselves do not, in the main, have the incentives or ability 
to fund, develop and distribute new drugs.  Thus, patent protection must ensure that the 
pharmaceutical industry's incentive to create remains strong.  If properly administered, a 
system of intellectual property rights, combined with a compulsory licensing regime 
could strike the appropriate balance.223  On the other hand, a system of intellectual 
property that guarantees no return on investment and allows for the expropriation of 
intellectual property rights without proper compensation or enforceable limits will reduce 
the incentive to research and invest into the area and exacerbate the relative dearth in 
medicines for “third world” diseases.  Such a situation must be avoided.  But another, 
possibly larger, problem is that the current system of patent protection does not create the 
incentives necessary to encourage research and development into diseases for which there 
is little or no possibility for return.  Instead, diseases primarily afflicting the developing 
world – including but not limited to malaria and tuberculosis – remain under-funded.224  It 
is, therefore, incumbent upon the governments of the developed world to provide 
incentives to the pharmaceutical industry to research and develop treatments and vaccines 
for these neglected diseases, directly fund the research and develop treatments and 
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vaccines themselves, or totally recalibrate the patent system for traditionally neglected 
diseases. 
¶79 Simply stated, the current system does not provide incentives to research 
developing country diseases.225  But the patent system alone is not the problem, as 
pharmaceutical companies have in recent years expended significant resources to combat 
diseases which afflict both the developed and developing world (such as HIV/AIDS) and 
the disparity between the two groups of nations has increased in recent years.226  Even 
more important than the current system of IPRs to the lack of access to medicines and 
corresponding health crises in the developing world is one of funding: developing 
countries do not have adequate resources, developing countries misallocate resources, 
international support is inadequate and the levels of research and development into 
diseases afflicting the developing world is insufficient.227  As Attaran and Gillespie-White 
conclude: 
“[A] variety of de facto barriers are more responsible for impeding access 
to antiretroviral treatment, including but not limited to the poverty of 
African countries, the high cost of antiretroviral treatment, national 
regulatory requirements for medicines, tariffs and sales taxes, and, above 
all, a lack of sufficient international financial aid to fund antiretroviral 
treatment.”228 
¶80 Therefore, while a solution to alleviating the public health crises currently 
tormenting much of the developing world is achievable, such a solution cannot be 
attained by merely amending, or even abandoning, TRIPS and patent laws or by 
implementing only one of the initiatives outlined above.  This is especially the case given 
that while over 95% of the WHO Essential Drugs List is off-patent, these inflictions and 
diseases continue to decimate much of the developing world.229  The initiatives suggested 
in this article must be explored in combination to tackle the twin problems of inadequate 
development of vaccines and drugs and access to existing vaccines and drugs facing 
developing countries.  Developed countries and the international community must 
increase both the amount as well as the coordination of funding and aid activities, 
developing countries must prioritize public health, improve infrastructure and work 
towards creating an environment conducive to growth and sustainability, and alternatives 
to current research and development schemes (such as alternatives to patents, the further 
development of PPPs and the provision of research incentives/subsidies to the 
pharmaceutical industry) must be studied and implemented.  It is only then when, through 
global commitment from the entire international community, that the public health crises 
may be alleviated and suffering end. 
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